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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Among the many options under discussion for controlling the growth in Medicare spending is one that would 
restructure Medicare’s benefit design in a manner that would achieve savings.  Several recent deficit-
reduction proposals suggest replacing the current Medicare benefit design with a combined deductible for 
Parts A and B and a uniform coinsurance on virtually all Medicare-covered services, coupled with a new limit 
on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending.  Medicare currently has separate deductibles for Parts A and B, 
varying cost-sharing amounts for covered services, and no out-of-pocket spending limit.  Some have 
proposed to achieve additional savings by combining a restructured Medicare benefit design with a policy 
that prohibits Medigap policies from providing so-called “first-dollar” coverage that pays for virtually all 
Medicare deductibles and coinsurance for covered services. 
This study examines the effects of restructuring the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) benefit design in 2013, 
with a $550 deductible for Parts A and B, a 20 percent coinsurance on virtually all services (including 
inpatient, home health, and skilled nursing facility), and a $5,500 limit on cost sharing for Medicare-covered 
services, based on parameters specified in some recent deficit-reduction proposals.  In addition, we examine 
the effects of imposing a higher or lower limit on out-of-pocket spending, and consider the implications of 
implementing the alternative Medicare benefit design along with restrictions on first-dollar Medigap 
coverage.  We examine the effects of these benefit changes on beneficiary out-of-pocket spending, and on 
spending by Medicare, Medicaid (state and federal), employers (including TRICARE), and other supplemental 
insurers.  Unless otherwise noted, beneficiary out-of-pocket spending includes the deductible and cost 
sharing for Medicare-covered services only and premiums for Medicare and supplemental coverage.  Because 
the cost-sharing restructuring proposals generally do not change the Part D drug benefit, our analysis 
excludes out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs and premiums for Part D coverage.   
Efforts to model programmatic and policy reforms require a number of policy and behavioral assumptions 
and some degree of uncertainty.  We model the specified changes in Medicare’s benefit design, assuming full 
implementation in 2013 and no changes in supplemental coverage in that year – other than the 
aforementioned restriction on Medigap first-dollar coverage.  We assume static insurance coverage – that is, 
no change in the share of beneficiaries with supplemental coverage or in the share of benefits paid by 
supplemental insurers – under the alternative benefit design.  We made this assumption because there is no 
definitive evidence suggesting what the direction or magnitude of such changes in supplemental coverage 
might be, and because it seems unlikely that major changes would occur in the first year of implementation 
(though changes could occur over a longer period of time).  If supplemental payers reduce the generosity of 
coverage or drop coverage altogether in response to changes in Medicare’s benefit design in 2013, we would 
expect that costs would generally be shifted onto Medicare-eligible enrollees, resulting in higher average out-
of-pocket spending and greater savings for supplemental payers and Medicare than our results suggest.  A 
detailed description of the methodology, key assumptions, and limitations is included in Appendix A.   
Our estimates of changes in beneficiary out-of-pocket spending, both cost sharing and premiums, are driven 
by two main factors.  The first factor relates to individual health status and expected use of Medicare-
covered services.  The second factor relates to each beneficiary’s source of supplemental coverage, if 
applicable.  Today, 90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have supplemental coverage, including employer-
sponsored retiree health plans, Medigap, and Medicaid.  Supplemental insurers typically cover a portion of 
their enrollees’ expenses, including deductibles and coinsurance.  Thus, the type and generosity of 
supplemental insurance play a major role in determining the impact of Medicare cost-sharing restructuring 
on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending, including premiums.   
KEY FINDINGS 
Restructuring Medicare’s fee-for-service benefit design, with a single deductible for Parts A 
and B of $550, 20 percent coinsurance on most Medicare-covered services, and a $5,500 
annual limit on cost sharing in 2013: 
 Nearly three-fourths (71 percent) of the 41 million beneficiaries in the fee-for-service Medicare 
program would have higher out-of-pocket spending (including premiums and cost sharing for 
Medicare-covered services) under the alternative Medicare benefit design, 5 percent would have 
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71%
5%
5%
No/nominal 
change
24%
Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Change in Expected Out-
of-Pocket Spending Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
Exhibit ES1
Among 5%, 
average reduction =
$1,570
Among 71%, 
average increase =
$180
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket costs includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. No/nominal change group includes 
beneficiaries with changes in spending no more than ±$25.
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
Spending 
reduction
Spending 
increase
Total Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, 2013 = 40.8 million
Average among 12% with 
increase greater than $250 =
$660
lower out-of-pocket spending, 
and 24 percent would have a 
nominal or no change in 
spending (i.e., changes no 
greater than ±$25) in 2013 
(Exhibit ES1).   
 The direction and amount of 
changes in out-of-pocket 
spending are greatly influenced 
by beneficiaries’ supplemental 
coverage and medical needs: 
o Supplemental coverage. 
Supplemental payers, such as 
employer-sponsored retiree 
health plans that enroll about 
one-third of all Medicare 
beneficiaries, are expected to 
help enrollees pay for the 
new cost-sharing 
requirements under the alternative benefit design.  However, supplemental plans are also 
expected to pass some of these new expenses on to enrollees in the form of higher premiums.  
While supplemental coverage would shield some enrollees from large increases in spending 
associated with higher cost-sharing requirements under the alternative benefit design, out-of-
pocket spending would nonetheless go up for many, because they would be responsible for a 
portion of the higher cost-sharing requirements and higher premiums for supplemental 
coverage.  Even those who do not use any Medicare-covered services in a given year – a small 
share of the total Medicare population – would see their costs rise due to higher insurance 
premiums. 
o Medical needs.  The amount and type of services used by beneficiaries is also an important 
factor in determining the expected change in out-of-pocket spending under the alternative 
benefit design.  Beneficiaries with lower utilization – those who tend to have only a few 
physician visits in a year but use no inpatient care – would generally be expected to face higher 
costs, largely because they would face a new uniform deductible ($550) that would be higher 
than the Part B deductible under current law.  Beneficiaries with higher utilization – for example 
those who use both inpatient and post-acute care or other high-cost outpatient services – would 
be more likely to benefit from the alternative benefit design, because they are more likely to 
incur expenditures that would exceed the new cost-sharing limit.  
 Among the 29 million beneficiaries expected to see spending increases, the average increase would 
be $180 in 2013, which includes increases in both premiums for Medicare Part B and supplemental 
coverage and cost sharing for Medicare-covered services.  Those who would face spending increases 
generally include beneficiaries in better health who tend to use physician but no hospital services.   
 Nearly 5 million Medicare beneficiaries (12 percent of those in the FFS program) would see fairly 
significant increases in out-of-pocket spending of $250 or more in 2013, with an average increase of 
$660 each.  The majority of beneficiaries who would face increases of $250 or more use physician 
and other Part B services, but no inpatient care (3.6 million).  This group also includes 1.5 million 
beneficiaries in fair or poor health; 1.7 million beneficiaries with no supplemental coverage; and 1.8 
million beneficiaries with incomes between 100 percent and 200 percent of the federal poverty 
level, who are typically not on Medicaid.1 
 For the 2 million beneficiaries who would face a reduction in out-of-pocket spending, the average 
reduction would be almost $1,600 in 2013.  Those most likely to see spending reductions include 
users of both inpatient and post-acute care, with spending often exceeding the cost-sharing limit.   
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Exhibit ES2
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Other supplemental insurers includes Veterans’ Administration, Indian Health Service and other federal sources; 
other state and local sources; worker’s compensation; and other unclassified sources.
Net Change in Total Health Care Spending From Current Law 
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
Medicare Medicaid: Federal - State
Beneficiaries
Employers
Other 
supplemental insurers
TRICARE
SPENDING 
DECREASES
SPENDING 
INCREASES
NET 
CHANGE
Total = 
$4.3 billion 
decrease
Total = 
$3.6 billion 
increase
Total = 
$0.7 billion 
decrease
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
 Compared to current law, 
Medicare spending under the 
alternative benefit design would 
decrease by $4.2 billion and 
Medicaid spending (federal and 
state combined) would decrease 
by $0.1 billion in 2013 – a total 
decrease of $4.3 billion (Exhibit 
ES2).  Aggregate spending would 
increase for beneficiaries by $2.3 
billion.  In addition, aggregate 
spending would increase for 
employers ($0.6 billion), TRICARE 
($0.2 billion), and other payers 
($0.4 billion), for a total increase 
of $3.6 billion.   
o These changes would result 
in a net reduction in total 
health care spending of $0.7 
billion in 2013.   
o On net, federal spending – including Medicare, the federal portion of Medicaid, and TRICARE – 
would decrease by $4.1 billion in 2013 under the alternative benefit design. 
 
Varying the Cost-Sharing Limit  
 Raising or lowering the limit on beneficiary cost sharing for Medicare-covered services would have a 
significant impact on the share of beneficiaries who would experience an increase or decrease in 
out-of-pocket spending and on aggregate beneficiary and federal spending.   
o If the limit were increased from $5,500 to $7,500, the share of beneficiaries facing a spending 
increase would remain unchanged (71 percent versus 72 percent), but the share estimated to 
have a spending increase of $250 or more would increase from 12 percent to 39 percent.   
o With a lower $4,000 limit, nearly one-third of beneficiaries (30 percent) would see a reduction in 
out-of-pocket spending (versus 5 percent with a $5,500 limit), while a smaller share (8 percent) 
would have spending increases of $250 or more.   
o Compared to current law, federal spending would decrease by $13.2 billion with a $7,500 cost-
sharing limit, but would increase by $5.1 billion with a $4,000 limit.  
 
Restructuring Medicare’s Benefit Design with Restrictions on Medigap “First-Dollar” Coverage  
 About 1 in 5 Medicare beneficiaries has a Medigap policy, and virtually all Medigap policyholders 
have first-dollar coverage.  If the restructured Medicare benefit design were combined with 
restrictions on Medigap first-dollar coverage (no coverage of the first $550 in costs, and no more 
than 50 percent coverage of cost sharing up to the out-of-pocket limit): 
o Overall, half of all Medicare FFS beneficiaries would be expected to have higher out-of-pocket 
costs (including premiums); nearly one quarter (24 percent) would have lower costs, and 26 
percent would face no or a nominal change in spending.   
 A larger share of beneficiaries would see cost decreases if the alternative benefit design were 
implemented with Medigap restrictions than without (24 percent versus 5 percent, respectively). 
o More than 8 million beneficiaries, or 20 percent of FFS beneficiaries, would be expected to see 
out-of-pocket costs decrease by more than $250 in 2013 under the alternative benefit design 
with Medigap restrictions.  This group includes many beneficiaries in relatively good health who 
use few services, and many Medigap policyholders.   
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o However, nearly 6 million Medicare beneficiaries in the FFS program (14 percent) would be 
expected to see out-of-pocket costs increase by more than $250 (with an average increase of 
$780 each).  This group includes 2.5 million Medicare beneficiaries who are Medigap 
policyholders, 2.1 million in fair or poor health, and 3.2 million beneficiaries with incomes below 
200 percent of the poverty level.2   
 Among Medigap policyholders specifically, 27 percent would face higher out-of-pocket spending for 
premiums and cost sharing; 71 percent would have lower spending, and 2 percent would face no or 
a nominal change in spending.  The relatively large share of Medigap policyholders who would 
experience a spending reduction is largely attributable to a decrease in Medigap premiums.  
Medigap premiums are expected to go down because Medigap would cover limited amounts of 
Medicare cost sharing; in addition, enrollees themselves would take on more cost-sharing 
responsibility and are expected to use fewer services as a result, and therefore Medigap plans would 
be covering cost sharing for fewer Medicare-covered claims. 
 The distribution of beneficiaries with spending reductions and increases under the alternative 
benefit design with Medigap coverage restrictions looks very different depending on whether the 
out-of-pocket spending measure includes both cost sharing and premium changes, as above, or 
cost-sharing amounts only.  This is particularly true for Medigap policyholders.  Excluding premiums, 
95 percent of Medigap enrollees would face an increase in out-of-pocket spending, 1 percent would 
face a decrease in spending, and 5 percent would face a nominal or no change.  Overall, 61 percent 
of Medigap enrollees would face an increase of $500 or more in out-of-pocket spending on cost 
sharing for Medicare-covered services only, excluding premium changes.   
 Federal savings would be substantially greater with Medigap restrictions than without ($8.8 billion 
vs. $4.1 billion), because Medigap enrollees would be expected to use fewer Medicare-covered 
services in response to their higher cost-sharing obligations.   
 Aggregate beneficiary spending would decrease on net by $1.5 billion, which reflects $10.3 billion in 
higher spending as a result of additional cost-sharing obligations, offset by an aggregate premium 
reduction of $11.8 billion (including Part B and supplemental coverage). 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis illustrates the expected shifts in costs that are likely to occur in 2013 if Medicare fee-for-
service cost-sharing requirements are restructured, as has been recommended by some as part of 
deficit-reduction efforts.  This work underscores a dilemma for policymakers:  a restructured Medicare 
benefit design with a new limit on beneficiary cost sharing for Medicare-covered services has the 
potential to produce savings to Medicare while also providing substantial help to a minority of 
beneficiaries with high medical spending, but would also impose additional costs on a majority of 
beneficiaries who are relatively healthy and modest users of medical care.  While most beneficiaries 
would not reach the cost-sharing limit in any given year, knowing that Medicare coverage includes a 
catastrophic limit could give them peace of mind and a greater sense of financial security, as well as 
mitigate the need to obtain supplemental coverage.  With most beneficiaries currently covered by 
supplemental insurance, the effects of a restructured benefit design would be attenuated somewhat, 
because supplemental insurers would cover a large share of beneficiaries’ new cost-sharing obligations.   
Our study does not address the health or long-term cost implications of imposing new cost-sharing 
requirements on beneficiaries.  We assume beneficiaries would use fewer services when confronted 
with higher cost-sharing requirements, which in turn would lower both Medicare and out-of-pocket 
spending.  Other studies have found that people forego both necessary and unnecessary care, the 
former of which could lead to health complications and additional costs in the long run.   
Building on our analysis, future research could consider the various ways in which a restructured 
Medicare benefit design could provide greater financial protections to beneficiaries, minimize the need 
for beneficiaries to purchase supplemental insurance, encourage beneficiaries to use higher value care, 
and minimize cost shifting that could adversely affect beneficiaries, states, and other payers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicare figures prominently in various proposals to reduce federal spending and the national debt.3  
One of the options that has received attention would be to reform Medicare’s benefit design, with a 
single combined deductible for Medicare Parts A and B, uniform coinsurance for virtually all Medicare 
services, and a new annual limit on beneficiaries’ cost sharing for Medicare-covered services.  Currently, 
Medicare has a deductible for inpatient care under Part A ($1,132 in 2011), a separate deductible for 
physician and other outpatient services under Part B ($162 in 2011), cost-sharing requirements that vary 
by type of service, and no limit on out-of-pocket spending.4    Some have also proposed to combine the 
restructured Medicare benefit with a prohibition on Medicare supplemental insurance (Medigap) 
policies from providing so-called “first-dollar” coverage, making policyholders responsible for a greater 
share of the cost of Medicare-covered services. 
 
Proposals that would restructure Medicare’s benefit design could achieve several objectives.  An early 
version of this idea was designed to improve coverage and rationalize and simplify the cost-sharing 
structure for beneficiaries.5  Others, notably the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 
have examined restructuring Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements in ways that would encourage 
beneficiaries to use higher-value care and discourage them from using lower-value care.6  More recent 
benefit restructuring ideas under consideration in deficit-reduction discussions have been designed to 
achieve Medicare savings.  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), restructuring Medicare 
cost sharing – with a single deductible of $550, a 20 percent coinsurance rate applied to all services, and 
a $5,500 limit on out-of-pocket spending – would reduce Medicare outlays by $2.7 billion in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2013 and $32.2 billion over the nine-year period from FY 2013 to 2021.7  If this proposal were 
implemented in conjunction with a prohibition on first-dollar coverage through Medigap policies, CBO 
estimates that Medicare savings would be $6.9 billion in FY 2013 and $92.5 billion between 2013 and 
2021.   
 
Elements of Medicare benefit design proposals have been included in recent deficit reduction proposals 
put forth by various entities and individuals, including the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform (also known as Bowles-Simpson), the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force 
(also known as Domenici-Rivlin), former Congressional Budget Office director Alice Rivlin and 
Representative Paul Ryan, and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Tom Coburn (Exhibit 1).8   
 
Exhibit 1  
Proposals to Restructure Medicare’s Benefit Design and Restrict Medigap Coverage 
 National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and 
Reform (2010) 
Debt Reduction Task 
Force (2010) 
Rivlin-Ryan proposal 
(2010) 
Lieberman-Coburn 
proposal (2011) 
Medicare Cost-Sharing Proposals 
Deductible and 
coinsurance 
$550 deductible and 20% 
coinsurance (5% for costs 
between $5,500 and cost-
sharing limit) 
$560 deductible and 20% 
coinsurance 
$600 deductible and 20% 
coinsurance 
$550 deductible 
(coinsurance amount not 
specified) 
Cost-sharing limit  $7,500 $5,250 $6,000 $7,500 to $22,500 
(depending on income) 
Medigap Proposals 
Medigap 
restrictions 
Eliminates coverage of first 
$500; limits coverage to 
50% of the next $5,000 in 
cost sharing  
No provision Eliminates coverage of first 
$500; limits coverage to 
50% of cost sharing above 
that amount 
Eliminates coverage of first 
$550; limits coverage to 
50% of cost sharing above 
that amount 
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Those who support reforming Medicare’s cost-sharing design offer several reasons for the change.  First 
is the potential to reduce Medicare spending, which would help to reduce the federal budget deficit.  To 
the extent that these reforms increase cost-sharing requirements, with beneficiaries and supplemental 
insurers bearing more of the cost of Medicare-covered services, beneficiaries could become more price-
sensitive in using medical care, resulting in lower utilization and greater Medicare savings.9  Second is 
the opportunity to simplify Medicare cost sharing for beneficiaries and more closely align it to benefit 
designs typically offered by large employer plans.10  Third, an annual cost-sharing limit could shield high-
cost beneficiaries from significant out-of-pocket costs for Medicare-covered services, and mitigate the 
need for supplemental insurance, such as employer-sponsored retiree health plans and Medigap.  While 
most beneficiaries may not reach the limit in any given year, knowing that Medicare coverage includes a 
catastrophic limit could give them peace of mind and a greater sense of financial security.   
 
Others have expressed concern that restructuring Medicare cost sharing has the potential to shift 
significant costs from Medicare onto beneficiaries and other payers, and that the higher cost sharing 
imposed on certain services, in conjunction with Medigap coverage restrictions, would result in some 
beneficiaries foregoing needed care, which could lead to higher Medicare spending in the long run.11   
Although some beneficiaries with significant medical needs could see their out-of-pocket spending 
decline if they have expenses that exceeds the new cost-sharing limit, others (particularly those who use 
few services) could face higher spending due to the combined deductible that is greater than the current 
Part B deductible and the new coinsurance requirements for certain services.  These new cost-sharing 
requirements could be particularly burdensome for beneficiaries without supplemental coverage and 
those with modest incomes.  
 
Previous studies have analyzed various approaches to Medicare cost-sharing reforms and Medigap 
coverage restrictions, with some reforms reducing beneficiary spending at a cost to the government and 
others increasing beneficiary costs to achieve Medicare savings.12,13,14,15  Prior studies confirm that the 
specific design parameters matter greatly in determining the share of beneficiaries likely to be affected 
(positively or negatively), the direction and magnitude of effects on federal spending (savings or 
spending), and the tradeoffs involved in raising costs somewhat for a large share of the population in 
order to provide greater financial protection to a small share of beneficiaries with exceptionally high costs.   
 
This study builds upon previous research to provide a timely analysis of recently proposed cost-sharing 
reforms.  Our analysis focuses on the options discussed by the CBO in its March 2011 report, which are 
reflected in or similar to proposals included in recent deficit-reduction plans.  The recent CBO analysis 
estimates the effect on Medicare spending, but does not address the cost implications for individuals, 
employers, and states.  In addition to discussing the implications for beneficiary out-of-pocket spending, 
our analysis also presents estimates of the distributional impact that cost-sharing restructuring 
proposals are expected to have on different groups of beneficiaries. 
 
ABOUT THIS ANALYSIS 
 
This analysis takes an in-depth look at proposals to restructure Medicare’s benefit design, modeling the 
effects on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending, federal and state spending, and employer spending.  
The effects are modeled for implementation in calendar year 2013.  The analysis documents the share of 
beneficiaries who would be expected to incur higher or lower out-of-pocket spending under the 
proposed benefit design changes relative to current law, the expected average increase or decrease in 
spending, and the characteristics of beneficiaries estimated to have higher and lower spending.  
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We modeled the effect of replacing the current Medicare benefit design in 2013 with an alternative that 
has a single deductible for Parts A and B of $550, a 20 percent coinsurance rate on Medicare-covered 
services (including inpatient, home health and skilled nursing facility, but excluding hospice), and an 
annual limit on out-of-pocket spending for Medicare-covered services, set at $5,500 (Exhibit 2).  
Compared to current law, this policy lowers the deductible for those who would otherwise pay the Part 
A deductible and raises the deductible for beneficiaries who would otherwise only pay the Part B 
deductible.  These parameters are the same as those specified by the CBO in its analysis of spending and 
revenue options in March 2011, and are similar, but not identical, to those recommended by the 
Bowles-Simpson Commission and the Domenici-Rivlin Debt Reduction Task Force.  We also assessed the 
effects of modifying this proposal by varying the limit on out-of-pocket spending, modeling a lower 
($4,000) and higher ($7,500) limit.16  
 
We then modeled the effects of implementing this alternative benefit design together with a proposal 
that prohibits Medigap policies from providing first-dollar coverage, based on the parameters specified 
by the CBO, whereby Medigap policies would be prohibited from covering the first $550 of Medicare 
cost-sharing requirements (i.e., the new unified deductible), and Medigap coverage would be limited to 
50 percent of cost sharing for Medicare-covered services above the deductible up to the new limit on 
out-of-pocket spending.  Under current law, Medigap insurers are required to offer policies that 
conform to standard benefit designs.  Today, there are 10 plan types, and the majority of Medigap 
policyholders have plans C and F, both of which offer first-dollar coverage, including coverage of 
Medicare Part A and B deductibles and coinsurance for covered services.17 
 
Exhibit 2 
Comparison of Cost-Sharing Requirements under the Current Medicare Program and  
an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013 
BENEFIT DESIGN CURRENT ALTERNATIVE 
Deductible Part A: $1,204 per benefit period Part B: $156 Combined Part A/B: $550 
Out-of-pocket spending limit None $5,500 
Part A services   
Inpatient hospital  No coinsurance for first 60 days  
$301/day for days 61-90 
$602/day for days 91-150  
No coverage  for days after 150 
20% coinsurance 
Skilled nursing facility   No coinsurance for first 20 days 
$150.50/day for days 21-100 
No coverage for days after 100 
20% coinsurance 
Home health No coinsurance 20% coinsurance 
Hospice No coinsurance NO CHANGE 
Inpatient psychiatric hospital Same coverage as inpatient hospital stay  
(up to 190 days in a lifetime) 
20% coinsurance 
Part B services   
Physician and other medical services (such 
as ambulatory surgical services) 20% coinsurance 20% coinsurance 
Clinical laboratory services No coinsurance 20% coinsurance 
Home health care No coinsurance 20% coinsurance 
Outpatient mental health services 35% coinsurance (phasing down to 20% in 2014) 20% coinsurance 
One-time "Welcome to Medicare" physical 
exam and annual “Wellness” visit No coinsurance 20% coinsurance 
Preventive services No coinsurance for most services (although 20% 
coinsurance for some).  Some limitations based on 
frequency, type of service, and patient’s age and 
medical history.   
20% coinsurance 
NOTE:  Table does not include all Medicare-covered benefits, and does not include Part C or Part D coverage because the alternative benefit 
design would not apply to those parts of the program.  Current law dollar amounts for 2013 are based on estimates from the 2011 Medicare 
Trustees Report. 
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OVERVIEW OF METHODS 
 
This analysis examines the effects of restructuring Medicare’s benefit design, using a model developed 
by the Actuarial Research Corporation (ARC) for the Kaiser Family Foundation, based on the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2006-2008.  The dataset includes individual-level spending, utilization, 
supplemental insurance coverage, and demographic information on the Medicare population receiving 
services covered under the fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program.  Although MEPS includes 
beneficiaries who are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans, they were excluded from this analysis 
because these plans do not follow the standard Medicare cost-sharing structure and cost sharing varies 
from plan to plan.  The dataset also does not explicitly identify coverage through the Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Program. 
 
We modeled implementation of the restructured Medicare benefit design on its own and combined 
with the restrictions on first-dollar Medigap coverage in calendar year 2013, in order to show the full 
effects of these policies if implemented in the near future.  To show the effects of these changes on 
beneficiaries’ financial obligations for Medicare-covered services, we estimated the effects on premiums 
and cost sharing separately, but present them in combination in the main report, which we refer to as 
“out-of-pocket spending,”  Beneficiaries estimated to have a change in out-of-pocket spending of less 
than $25 (increase or decreases) are shown as having “no/nominal change.” 
 
Using the MEPS dataset, we first controlled the data to 2013 spending levels from CBO’s March 2011 
Fact Sheet, with additional detail by aged/disabled and service broken out using data from the 2011 
Trustees Report and the 2010 Health Care Financing Review Statistical Supplement.18  We estimated 
baseline cost-sharing spending patterns by applying current-law cost-sharing rules to each record in the 
dataset.  Cost sharing was distributed among out-of-pocket and supplemental insurers based on the 
actual distribution of spending at the record level, which reflects each individual’s source of coverage 
(including different sources of coverage during the year, where applicable) and generosity of coverage.  
We then applied the future-law cost-sharing rules to the dataset to estimate the amount and 
distribution of spending based on the proposed benefit design reforms.  We adjusted spending to 
account for changes in utilization expected to occur in response to exposure to higher or lower cost-
sharing requirements, using induction assumptions that vary by service type, reflecting greater price 
sensitivity to certain services (e.g., physician visits) than others (e.g., inpatient admissions).  For 
spending on premiums, we assumed that each type of payer (e.g., Medigap, employer-sponsored 
insurance) charges the same premium to all of its enrollees under current law and would continue to do 
so under a restructured Medicare benefit design.   
 
Efforts to model programmatic and policy reforms invariably require a number of assumptions and some 
degree of uncertainty.  Our analysis incorporated a variety of modeling decisions and assumptions that 
influence our results.  First, we modeled the effects of full implementation of these benefit design 
changes in 2013, although we recognize the administrative challenges of implementing such changes by 
then, as well as possible legal issues associated with prohibiting first-dollar coverage for current 
Medigap policyholders.19   We modeled the effects of the Medicare benefit redesign assuming static 
insurance coverage (i.e., no change in coverage) before and after the changes to the benefit design, 
both because there is no definitive evidence to suggest what the direction or magnitude of such changes 
in supplemental coverage might be, and because our model produces results for a single year and 
therefore it seems unlikely that we would observe meaningful changes in coverage in that time period 
that would affect our results.  We also assumed that supplemental payers would continue to cover the 
same portion of enrollees’ Medicare-covered expenses (and premiums, if applicable) under the 
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alternative Medicare benefit design as they do under the current FFS design.  To the extent that 
supplemental insurers made changes to their coverage that shifted more costs onto enrollees, we would 
expect Medicare (and supplemental payers) to see greater savings and beneficiaries to face larger 
increases in average out-of-pocket costs, relative to our results.  We also conducted a sensitivity analysis 
around changes in the share of benefits paid by supplemental insurers to test the robustness of our 
results relative to our assumption of no change.  A more complete discussion of how changes to our 
assumptions could affect our results and the results of sensitivity testing is included in Appendix A (see 
“Key Model Parameters, Assumptions, and Limitations”). 
 
The process of modeling the effects of a policy change for more than 40 million Medicare beneficiaries 
requires policy and behavioral assumptions that may oversimplify individual decisions and responses, 
while averaging out variations in circumstances.  We nonetheless took this approach to develop a 
greater understanding of the expected effects of this proposal for beneficiaries and spending.  An 
important limitation of our analysis is that while the model assumes that higher cost sharing results in 
lower utilization, it is beyond the scope of this analysis to consider any secondary effects resulting from 
changes in beneficiaries’ medical use and spending.  Reductions in utilization might adversely affect the 
health status of beneficiaries, which is of concern in itself, but could also potentially lead to the use of 
more health services, and thus higher costs, over the long run.  Two recent research papers have 
indicated the possibility of offsetting effects in response to increased cost sharing.20  Rather than going 
without care altogether, beneficiaries might substitute some types of services for others.21  Although we 
did not model these secondary effects, this is an important area to explore in future research.   
 
A detailed description of the methods, data, and assumptions used in this analysis and the results of 
sensitivity testing is included in Appendix A.  Appendix B presents the full results of our analysis in a 
series of supplementary tables.  Dollar estimates presented in the report, exhibits, and tables are 
rounded to the nearest $10. 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
Modeling the Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design 
The following are the key effects of restructuring the Medicare benefit design, with a single deductible 
for Parts A and B of $550, 20 percent coinsurance on most Medicare-covered services, and a $5,500 
annual limit on cost sharing in 2013:   
 Nearly three-fourths (71 percent) of all beneficiaries in the traditional Medicare FFS program would 
have higher out-of-pocket spending for premiums and cost sharing under the alternative benefit 
design than under current law, 5 percent would have lower out-of-pocket spending, and nearly one 
quarter (24 percent) would have a nominal or no change in out-of-pocket spending.   
 The average increase among those with higher spending would be $180 in 2013; among the 
relatively small share of beneficiaries with lower costs, the average decrease would be $1,570.   
 Medicare spending would decrease by $4.2 billion and Medicaid spending (state and federal 
combined) would decline by $0.1 billion in 2013, for a total reduction of $4.3 billion.  Costs are 
projected to increase for beneficiaries (by $2.3 billion), employers (by $0.6 billion), TRICARE ($0.2 
billion), and other insurers (by $0.4 billion), for a total increase of $3.6 billion.  The net change in 
health care spending would be a $0.7 billion reduction in 2013.  
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71%
5%
5%
No/nominal 
change
24%
Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Change in Expected Out-
of-Pocket Spending Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
Exhibit 3
Among 5%, 
average reduction =
$1,570
Among 71%, 
average increase =
$180
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket costs includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. No/nominal change group includes 
beneficiaries with changes in spending no more than ±$25.
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
Spending 
reduction
Spending 
increase
Total Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, 2013 = 40.8 million
Average among 12% with 
increase greater than $250 =
$660
Impact on Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket Spending for Premiums and Cost Sharing  
Our estimates of changes in beneficiary out-of-pocket spending, both cost sharing and premiums, are 
driven by two main factors.  The first factor relates to individual health status and expected use of 
Medicare-covered services.  The second factor relates to each beneficiary’s source of supplemental 
coverage, if applicable.  Today, 90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have supplemental coverage, 
including employer-sponsored retiree health plans, Medigap, and Medicaid.  Supplemental insurers 
typically cover a portion of their enrollees’ expenses, including deductibles and coinsurance.  Thus, the 
type and generosity of supplemental insurance would play a major role in determining the impact of 
Medicare cost-sharing restructuring on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending, including premiums.   
 
This policy would increase beneficiaries’ total out-of-pocket spending (including premiums and cost 
sharing) by a total of $2.3 billion in 2013 ($60 per capita) – resulting from a $0.8 billion increase in 
spending for Medicare-covered services and a $1.5 billion increase in spending on premiums.  
 Premiums.  Total premium payments would increase by $40 per capita, which consists of modest 
increases in premiums for Medicare Part B, employer-sponsored retiree plans, and Medigap policies. 
o Medicare Part B premiums are projected to increase slightly, by 1 percent in 2013 (an annual 
increase of $10 per enrollee).  The Part B premium would rise because Part B spending is 
projected to increase somewhat as a result of the benefit redesign, reflecting increases in 
Medicare spending for outpatient hospital costs that exceed the beneficiary cost-sharing limit.  
Beneficiary premiums would cover 25 percent of these additional costs (more for those with 
higher incomes).     
o Employer-sponsored insurance and Medigap plan premiums are also expected to increase, on 
average, reflecting increases in cost-sharing liabilities for beneficiaries covered by these plans.  
 Cost sharing for Medicare-covered services.  Across all beneficiaries in FFS Medicare, cost-sharing 
expenses would increase, on average, by $20 in 2013.  The effect of a restructured benefit design on 
an individual’s cost sharing would vary substantially across beneficiaries, based in part on the type 
and amount of services used (which reflects their medical needs), sources of supplemental 
coverage, and the complex ways in which the reforms affect cost sharing.   
 
The proposed benefit redesign, with its new annual cost-sharing limit, would provide substantial relief 
to a small group of beneficiaries with 
relatively high average spending, but 
would result in a modest increase in 
costs for a much larger share of the 
population with lower average 
spending. 
 Out-of-pocket spending on 
premiums and cost sharing would 
be higher for nearly three-fourths 
(71 percent) of all Medicare 
beneficiaries in the FFS program, 
lower for 5 percent of 
beneficiaries, and about the same 
for one-fourth of beneficiaries (24 
percent), relative to current law 
(Exhibit 3; Appendix B-Tables 1 
and 2).   
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Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Medical Service Use 
and Change in Expected Out-of-Pocket Spending Under an 
Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
5% 1%
17%
30%
63%
24%
21%
20%
24%
11%
60% 66%
47%
35%
16%
12% 12% 15% 11% 10%
Spending 
increase >$250
Spending 
increase <$250
No/nominal 
change
Spending 
reduction
Exhibit 4
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. SNF is skilled nursing facility. Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. 
No/nominal change group includes beneficiaries with changes in spending no more than ±$25. Users of hospitalization and SNF services are a 
subset of the 8.2 million beneficiaries with one or more hospitalization. Amounts may not total 100% due to rounding.
Number of 
beneficiaries:
Total FFS 
Medicare
40.8 million
Physician but no 
hospital services
29.6 million
One 
hospitalization 
5.8 million
Two or more 
hospitalizations
2.5 million
Hospitalization 
and SNF services
1.6 million
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
o Among the 71 percent of beneficiaries projected to face higher costs in 2013, average out-of-
pocket spending would rise by $180. 
 Nearly 5 million Medicare beneficiaries (12 percent of those in the FFS program) would see 
out-of-pocket spending increase by $250 or more in 2013, relative to current law, with an 
average increase of $660 each.  These are mostly beneficiaries with low cost sharing under 
current law whose costs would increase under the alternative benefit design as a result of 
the combined deductible and new cost-sharing charges, including the inpatient coinsurance 
beginning on day one of a hospital stay.  Those projected to have spending increases of 
$250 or more include:  1.5 million beneficiaries in fair or poor health; 1.7 million 
beneficiaries with no supplemental coverage; and 1.8 million beneficiaries with incomes 
between 100 percent and 200 percent of the federal poverty level, who are typically not on 
Medicaid.22 
o Among the 5 percent of beneficiaries expected to see a decrease in total out-of-pocket spending 
in 2013, the average decrease would be $1,570.   
 Three percent of all Medicare FFS beneficiaries would see a decrease in out-of-pocket 
spending of $250 or more, with an average reduction of $2,150 each.  These are mostly 
beneficiaries with high cost sharing under current law who would spend less under the new 
benefit design due to the annual cost-sharing limit. 
 
The expected change in beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending is largely a function of the amount and 
type of services beneficiaries use, which is related to their health status (Exhibit 4).   
The restructured cost-sharing design 
would affect different types of 
services in varied ways:  increasing 
(or applying new) coinsurance for 
some services, lowering it for other 
services, and changing the deductible 
that beneficiaries pay before 
coverage under Parts A and B begins.   
 Beneficiaries with lower 
utilization – those who tend to 
have only a few physician visits in 
a year but who use no inpatient 
care, and who may be relatively 
healthy – would be expected to 
face higher costs, largely because 
they would face a new uniform 
deductible that would be higher than the Part B deductible under current law.   
o Among those who only use Part B services (an estimated 73 percent of FFS Medicare 
beneficiaries in 2013), 78 percent would face an expected increase in out-of-pocket spending in 
2013 under the restructured cost-sharing design, relative to current law.  Just 1 percent would 
see savings, and 21 percent would have a nominal or no change in out-of-pocket spending. 
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Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Supplemental 
Coverage and Change in Expected Out-of-Pocket Spending Under an 
Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
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Exhibit 5 
Number of 
beneficiaries:
Total FFS 
Medicare
40.8 million
Employer-sponsored 
insurance
15.9 million
Medigap
11.8 million
Medicare only
4.1 million
Medicaid
6.9 million
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. Employer includes TRICARE enrollees. 
No/minimal change group includes beneficiaries with changes in spending no greater than ±$25. Amounts may not total 100% due to rounding.
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
 Beneficiaries with higher utilization – those who need expensive inpatient and post-acute care or 
who use other high-cost outpatient services, and who may be in relatively poor health – would be 
more likely to benefit from the alternative benefit design, because they are more likely to incur 
expenditures that would exceed the new cost-sharing limit.   
o Nearly one in five beneficiaries with one hospitalization (an estimated 17 percent in 2013) 
would see a reduction in their out-of-pocket spending, as would nearly one-third of those with 
two or more hospitalizations annually, and nearly two-thirds of those with a hospitalization 
followed by a stay in a skilled nursing facility; for this group, out-of-pocket spending is projected 
to be $1,090 lower, on average, under the alternative benefit design than under current law.   
 Beneficiaries with no utilization in 2013 would face no change in cost-sharing amounts but are 
expected to face higher costs under the alternative benefit design as a result of higher premiums for 
Medicare Part B and supplemental coverage, if applicable. 
 
Supplemental insurance also plays a major role in determining the impact of Medicare cost-sharing 
restructuring on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending (Exhibit 5).   
Supplemental payers are expected to 
help enrollees pay for the new cost-
sharing requirements under the 
alternative benefit design.  However, 
some supplemental plans are also 
expected to pass some of these new 
expenses on to enrollees in the form 
of higher premiums.  While 
supplemental coverage would shield 
some enrollees from large increases 
in spending associated with higher 
cost-sharing requirements under the 
alternative benefit design, out-of-
pocket spending would nonetheless 
go up for many, because they would 
be responsible for a portion of the 
higher cost-sharing requirements and 
higher premiums for their supplemental coverage.  Even those who do not use any Medicare-covered 
services in a given year – a small share of the total Medicare population – would see their costs rise due 
to higher insurance premiums. 
 Medicare FFS only (no supplemental coverage).  In comparison to other groups, beneficiaries 
without supplemental coverage, who are responsible for paying the full cost-sharing amount for 
Medicare-covered services, would be more likely to have relatively large increases in spending of 
$250 or more (42 percent, compared to 8 percent of all other beneficiaries).  Overall, more than half 
(56 percent) of the 4 million beneficiaries without supplemental coverage would face an increase in 
out-of-pocket spending compared to current law, 4 percent would have lower spending, and 40 
percent would have a nominal or no change.  Beneficiaries without supplemental coverage would 
benefit from the cost-sharing limit, but that level of financial protection is generally reached in any 
given year only by a very small share with very high medical spending.  The majority of those 
without supplemental coverage would face higher out-of-pocket costs due to the combined 
deductible for Part A and B services, coinsurance for inpatient hospital and SNF beginning on day 
one of a stay, and the imposition of new cost-sharing requirements for home health services.  
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 Employer-sponsored retiree coverage.  For the more than one-third (39 percent) of all Medicare 
beneficiaries who have supplemental coverage from an employer-sponsored plan (including 
TRICARE enrollees), virtually all (87 percent) would be expected to face an increase in out-of-pocket 
spending relative to current law, with an average increase of $150.  Beneficiaries with employer-
sponsored insurance tend to be healthier than others on Medicare, so they would be less likely to 
benefit from the annual cost-sharing limit and more likely to see their out-of-pocket spending 
increase due to the combined deductible and new cost-sharing requirements.  Having employer 
coverage would moderate the effect of the alternative benefit redesign on enrollees’ cost-sharing 
payments by covering a portion of enrollees’ new liabilities; however, some of the new employer 
plan spending would be passed on to all enrollees in the form of a modest average increase in 
premiums.  Premiums for employer-sponsored retiree coverage (but not TRICARE) are expected to 
increase by 6 percent in 2013 under the restructured benefit design ($40 per year for enrollees).   
 Medigap.  Medicare beneficiaries with Medigap would be expected to fare similarly to beneficiaries 
with employer coverage under the restructured cost-sharing design.  A large majority of Medicare 
beneficiaries with Medigap (93 percent) are projected to see an increase in out-of-pocket spending 
in 2013, relative to current law, with an average increase of $140.  Medigap premiums are projected 
to rise by 2 percent ($40 per year for enrollees), reflecting the expected increase in cost-sharing 
obligations for policyholders, some of which would be paid for by Medigap.   
 Medicaid.  In contrast to those with other sources of supplemental coverage, or none whatsoever, 
the vast majority of beneficiaries covered by Medicaid (83 percent) would see no substantial change 
in their out-of-pocket spending because Medicaid generally pays Medicare’s premiums, deductibles 
and coinsurance on behalf of full dual eligibles.  However, some full dual eligibles could be liable for 
cost sharing because they reside in states that do not pay Medicare’s coinsurance in full.  Moreover, 
our analysis may misstate the effects for full-year full-dual eligibles, because the model reflects a 
mix of full and partial benefits.  Beneficiaries with partial Medicaid coverage would be affected by 
the cost-sharing reforms.  For instance, Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMBs) 
receive assistance paying for Medicare premiums but not for cost sharing and would thus be 
responsible for the new unified deductible and coinsurance.  Additionally, part-year Medicaid 
enrollees could be responsible for cost sharing during the portion of the year when they were not 
covered by Medicaid.   
 
Because the type and amount of health spending and supplemental coverage under current law varies 
by demographic group, such as gender, age, and race/ethnicity, the alternative benefit design would 
have different implications for different subgroups of FFS beneficiaries (Appendix B-Table 1).   
 Relative to current law, subgroups of beneficiaries that are more likely than others to experience a 
reduction in out-of-pocket spending in 2013, or less likely than others to experience an increase in 
spending, include those with relatively low incomes and those of racial/ethnic minority groups.  
Conversely, subgroups that are more likely than others to have an increase in out-of-pocket 
spending, or less likely to have a reduction in spending, include those with relatively high incomes 
and white beneficiaries.   
 Partly because Medicaid and the Medicare Savings Programs (MSP) cover all or a portion of 
Medicare’s cost sharing for low-income Medicare beneficiaries, a smaller share of those with lower 
incomes would face higher costs associated with the restructured cost sharing than those with 
higher incomes.  This would also likely be the case for beneficiaries in racial/ethnic minority groups, 
who tend to have lower incomes than white beneficiaries and are therefore more likely to qualify 
for cost-sharing assistance from Medicaid or MSP.  However, our model does not have the ability to 
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Exhibit 6
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Other supplemental insurers includes Veterans’ Administration, Indian Health Service and other federal sources; 
other state and local sources; worker’s compensation; and other unclassified sources.
Net Change in Total Health Care Spending From Current Law 
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
Medicare Medicaid: Federal - State
Beneficiaries
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supplemental insurers
TRICARE
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Total = 
$4.3 billion 
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Total = 
$3.6 billion 
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Total = 
$0.7 billion 
decrease
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
allow us to quantify the interplay of supplemental coverage, utilization, and demographics (such as 
race/ethnicity, income, and age) – which could all be moving in tandem or in opposite directions – in 
order to fully explain the effects we observe at the subgroup level. 
 
Impact on Total Health Care Spending 
Proposals that involve making substantial changes to the Medicare program often have direct and 
indirect effects on other payers.  For example, an earlier study of the effects of raising the age of 
eligibility for Medicare from 65 to 67, also conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and ARC, 
illustrated that this policy would reduce Medicare spending but shift costs to other payers, and would 
ultimately result in an increase in total health spending.23  
As with the proposal to raise the age 
of Medicare eligibility, the proposal 
for restructuring Medicare’s benefit 
design would reduce federal 
spending but increase spending by 
beneficiaries and other payers, 
resulting in a net $0.7 billion 
reduction in total health care 
spending in 2013.  The net 
downward effect includes reductions 
in spending for Medicare ($4.2 
billion) and Medicaid ($0.1 billion), 
offset by increases for beneficiaries 
($2.3 billion), employers ($0.6 
billion), TRICARE ($0.2 billion), and 
other payers ($0.4 billion) (Exhibit 6). 
 
Medicare and Other Federal Spending.  Medicare and federal Medicaid spending would be 
expected to decrease by $4.2 billion ($3.6 billion if Part B premium receipts are excluded) and $0.05 
billion respectively, offset by a $0.2 billion increase in TRICARE spending. 
 
Our estimates of changes in Medicare spending assume implementation at the beginning of calendar 
year (CY) 2013 and are controlled to CBO’s estimates of changes in federal outlays.  Our estimate of 
federal savings ($4.2 billion in Medicare savings in CY 2013) differs slightly from that published by CBO in 
its March 2011 report ($2.7 billion in Medicare savings for fiscal year (FY) 2013).  More than half of the 
difference is due to CBO’s FY 2013 estimate only reflecting the first nine months of the 2013 calendar 
year, while our analysis includes a full 12-month calendar year estimate.  Further, our analysis takes into 
account Part B premium receipts in the calculation of savings, but CBO reflects only outlays.  If our 
analysis excluded premium receipts and used a fiscal year time frame, the savings would be identical 
because we aligned with CBO for aggregate changes to outlays before examining the distributional 
effects. 
 
The $3.6 billion reduction in Medicare spending, excluding premium receipts, includes a net $2.8 billion 
reduction in aggregate Medicare spending on FFS benefit payments and a $0.8 billion reduction in 
spending on Medicare Advantage, based on our assumption that payments to Medicare Advantage 
plans would be adjusted by the implied percentage change in benefits for FFS beneficiaries.24  Despite 
the new cost-sharing limit, Medicare spending would decrease, on net, primarily due to increasing 
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Net Change in Medicare Spending From Current Law 
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, 2013
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Exhibit 7
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
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Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
beneficiaries’ exposure to cost 
sharing for services that currently 
have no or very little coinsurance, 
including home health, the first 60 
days of a benefit period for 
hospitalizations, and the first 20 days 
of a SNF stay (Exhibit 7).   
 
Medicare benefit payments are 
estimated to increase for some 
services and decrease for others 
under the restructured cost-sharing 
design.  Under the restructured 
benefit design, Medicare spending 
would increase for skilled nursing 
facility and outpatient services by 
$8.2 billion overall, but would 
decrease for all other Medicare-covered services by $11.0 billion overall, for a net aggregate reduction 
in benefit spending of $2.8 billion.   
 
For Part A services, Medicare spending would decrease by $4.5 billion, which would improve the 
financial outlook of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund.  The net Part A reduction would result from the 
following spending changes: 
 $6.8 billion decrease for inpatient services, resulting from the 20 percent coinsurance for inpatient 
stays beginning on day one of a hospital stay and expected reduction in utilization. 
 $1.3 billion decrease for home health services covered by Part A, as a result of the new 20 percent 
coinsurance on home health services and expected reduction in utilization. 
 $3.6 billion increase for skilled nursing facility stays, as a large portion of SNF spending is preceded 
by a hospital stay with accompanying physician services, and thus would be expected to occur after 
beneficiaries had reached the catastrophic limit, and would therefore be covered by Medicare. 
 
For Part B services, Medicare spending would increase by $1.8 billion on net as a result of the following 
spending changes: 
 $4.6 billion increase for outpatient services, as the expense of those services and associated 
physician services plus the higher likelihood of inpatient hospital stays for outpatient service users 
would likely push their costs above the out-of-pocket maximum, which would shift costs from 
beneficiaries and other payers onto Medicare.   
 $2.3 billion decrease for home health services covered by Part B, due to the new coinsurance for 
these services and expected reduction in utilization. 
 $0.5 billion decrease for physician services, as a result of the combined deductible that is higher than 
the current-law deductible for Part B services and expected reduction in utilization. 
 
The $1.8 billion increase in Part B spending would be offset by a $0.6 billion increase in Part B premiums, 
which are set annually to cover 25 percent of Part B costs. 
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Medicaid Spending (Federal and State).  On net, Medicaid spending would decrease by about $0.1 
billion in 2013 as a result of this policy ($0.05 billion federal/ $0.04 billion states, based on percentages 
roughly equivalent to the federal/state share of aggregate Medicaid spending).25  Savings to Medicaid 
are primarily due to reductions in spending on benefit payments for dual eligibles with hospitalizations 
and/or post-acute SNF stays, as Medicare would assume a larger share of the cost for dual eligibles who 
reach Medicare’s new limit on out-of-pocket spending.   
 
Medicaid savings from the cost-sharing limit would be offset by higher Medicaid costs associated with 
the unified deductible (which would be higher for those using only Part B-covered services under 
current law) and the new coinsurance requirements for inpatient, home health, and SNF services.  
Medicaid savings would be further offset by $0.2 billion in higher spending on Part B premiums for dual 
eligibles, in accordance with the increase in Part B premiums that reflects higher Part B spending 
projected to occur under this policy. 
 
Employer Spending.  On net, costs associated with employer-sponsored retiree coverage would 
increase by $1.2 billion in 2013 as a result of this policy.  We assume half of this increase ($0.6 billion) 
would be paid by employers and half would be paid by retirees in the form of higher premiums.  This 
increase is largely a function of the unified deductible that would be higher under the restructured cost-
sharing design for those without an inpatient stay than under current law, and new coinsurance 
requirements for inpatient, SNF and home health services paid by beneficiaries with employer-
sponsored retiree health benefits.  Our analysis finds that employers would not benefit as much as 
might be expected from the out-of-pocket spending limit because cost sharing would essentially be 
shifted from higher-cost to lower-cost beneficiaries under the alternative benefit design.  While 
employers would no longer have to pay for extremely high cost sharing for high-cost beneficiaries, they 
would have to pay the combined deductible and 20 percent coinsurance where currently there is either 
no cost sharing whatsoever (home health) or none until a beneficiary exceeds a certain number of days 
in a hospital or skilled nursing facility. 
 
Modeling the Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Different 
Cost-Sharing Limits 
To understand how sensitive our results are to the specific threshold used to establish the limit on 
beneficiary cost sharing for Medicare-covered services, we modeled the restructured Medicare benefit 
design with limits above ($7,500) and below ($4,000) the $5,500 limit, holding constant the $550 
deductible and the 20 percent coinsurance on virtually all services.26  Under these different limits, we 
recalculated the impact on the share of beneficiaries estimated to have higher or lower spending, and 
the effects on aggregate beneficiary, federal, Medicaid, and employer spending. 
 Lowering the threshold from $5,500 to $4,000 would significantly increase the share of beneficiaries 
who would see a reduction in out-of-pocket spending, from 5 percent to 30 percent, and would 
decrease the share who would see an increase in out-of-pocket spending, from 71 percent to 37 
percent.  
 Conversely, increasing the limit from $5,500 to $7,500 would modestly decrease the number of 
beneficiaries who would see lower out-of-pocket spending as a result of the benefit restructuring, 
from 5 percent to 3 percent, but would have virtually no effect on the share of beneficiaries who 
would face an increase in out-of-pocket spending (71 percent versus 72 percent).  Imposing a higher 
limit, however, would significantly increase the number of beneficiaries with increases in spending 
of $250 or more (from 12 percent to 39 percent) (Appendix B-Tables 3, 4 and 5). 
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Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Change in Expected 
Out-of-Pocket Spending Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design
with Different Cost-Sharing Limits, 2013
Exhibit 8
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SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket costs includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. No/minimal change group includes 
beneficiaries with changes in spending no greater than ±$25. Amounts may not total 100% due to rounding.
 Overall, 12 percent of FFS beneficiaries would reach the out-of-pocket spending limit in 2013 if it 
were set at $5,500, a slightly larger share (16 percent) with a lower $4,000 limit, and a slightly 
smaller share (9 percent) with a higher $7,500 limit.  Because a small share of beneficiaries have 
relatively high costs in any given year, increasing the cost-sharing limit is not expected to have a 
large impact on the share reaching the limit.  Regardless of the threshold that is used to determine 
the spending limit, a greater share of beneficiaries in fair or poor health, those who require 
hospitalization (with or without post-acute care), and those ages 85 and over would reach the cost-
sharing limit than other beneficiaries (Appendix B-Table 6). 
 
Impact on Total Health Care Spending 
 
Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket 
Spending.  Aggregate beneficiary 
out-of-pocket spending would be 
$2.3 billion higher with a $5,500 limit 
than under current law, $2.5 billion 
lower with a $4,000 limit, and $7.2 
billion higher with the $7,500 limit 
than under current law (Exhibit 8).  
 
Federal Spending.  Federal 
spending (Medicare, Medicaid and 
TRICARE) would decrease by $4.1 
billion with a $5,500 cost-sharing 
limit (in conjunction with other 
changes in the deductible and 
coinsurance), but increase by $5.1 
billion with a $4,000 cost-sharing 
limit.  In contrast, a higher $7,500 limit would reduce federal spending by $13.2 billion, relative to 
current law.   
 
State Medicaid Spending.  State Medicaid spending would decrease by $0.04 billion with a $5,500 
cost-sharing limit on spending for Medicare-covered services, coupled with the combined deductible 
and the 20 percent coinsurance for most services, relative to current law.  State Medicaid spending 
would be expected to decrease by $0.5 billion with the lower $4,000 cost-sharing limit, but increase by 
$0.5 billion with a $7,500 cost-sharing limit, relative to current law. 
 
Employer Spending.  In contrast to the $5,500 cost-sharing limit that would increase employer costs 
by an estimated $0.6 billion in 2013, relative to current law, a $4,000 cost-sharing limit would decrease 
employer costs by $0.6 billion relative to current law, as additional costs for higher-cost retirees would 
be shifted onto Medicare.  With a higher cost-sharing limit of $7,500, employer costs would increase by 
$1.9 billion, relative to current law.  
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Exhibit 9
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Amounts may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Net Change in Total Health Care Spending From Current Law 
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design 
with Different Cost-Sharing Limits, 2013
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $4,000/$5,500/$7,500 cost-sharing limit
Cost-sharing limit:
$5,500 $4,000 $7,500
Federal – Total -$4.1 billion $5.1 billion -$13.2 billion
Medicare -$4.2 $5.8 -$14.4
Medicaid -$0.05 -$0.7 $0.6
TRICARE $0.2 -$0.1 $0.5
Beneficiary – Total $2.3 -$2.5 $7.2
Coinsurance $0.8 -$0.7 $2.4
Premiums $1.5 -$1.8 $4.8
State Medicaid -$0.04 -$0.5 $0.5
Employers $0.6 -$0.6 $1.9
Other supplemental insurers $0.4 $0.06 $0.8
Total savings $4.3 billion $4.4 billion $14.4 billion
Total spending $3.6 billion $5.9 billion $11.4 billion
Net Change in Total Health Spending: $0.7 billiondecrease
$1.5 billion
increase
$2.9 billion
decrease
Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Change in Expected 
Out-of-Pocket Spending Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design 
with and without Medigap Coverage Restrictions, 2013
24%
5%
26%
24%
36%
60%
14%
12%
Spending reduction No/nominal change Spending increase <$250 Spending increase >$250
Exhibit 10
Alternative benefit design:
- $550 deductible
- 20% coinsurance
- $5,500 cost-sharing limit
Alternative benefit design 
with Medigap restrictions:
- Alternative benefit design
- Medigap restrictions: 
 Plans cannot cover first 
$550 in Medicare A/B costs
 Plans cannot cover more 
than 50% of cost sharing up 
to new limit
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket costs includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. No/minimal change group includes 
beneficiaries with changes in spending no greater than ±$25.
Total Health Care Spending.  With 
a unified $550 deductible, 20 percent 
coinsurance and a $5,500 annual limit 
on beneficiary cost sharing, total 
health care costs are projected to 
decrease by $0.7 billion.  With a lower 
$4,000 limit, total health care costs 
would increase by $1.5 billion in 2013, 
primarily due to increases in 
Medicare benefits and corresponding 
increases in utilization.  In contrast, 
with a higher $7,500 limit, there 
would be larger reductions in federal 
spending, and total health care 
spending would be expected to 
decrease by $2.9 billion (Exhibit 9).  
Modeling the Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design in Combination 
with Restrictions on First-Dollar Medigap Coverage 
We modeled the effects of a restructured benefit design (with a $550 deductible for Parts A and B, 20 
percent coinsurance on most Medicare-covered services, and a $5,500 annual limit on cost sharing for 
Medicare-covered services in 2013) together with restrictions on first-dollar Medigap coverage.  Under 
these restrictions, Medigap policies would be prohibited from covering the first $550 of cost-sharing 
requirements under Parts A or B, and could cover no more than 50 percent of the coinsurance amount 
up to the new annual cost-sharing limit.  We assume these changes would be fully implemented in 2013 
and would be applied to all FFS beneficiaries, including those currently enrolled in Medigap plans. 
 
Impact on Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket Spending    
Under the alternative benefit design 
with Medigap coverage restrictions, 
out-of-pocket spending would 
increase for 50 percent of 
beneficiaries in the FFS Medicare 
program and decrease for 24 
percent, while 26 percent of 
beneficiaries would have a nominal 
or no change in spending in 2013, 
relative to current law (Exhibit 10).   
 A larger share of Medicare FFS 
beneficiaries are estimated to see 
a reduction in out-of-pocket 
spending with the additional 
restrictions on Medigap coverage 
than under the alternative benefit 
design alone (24 percent versus 5 percent), which is primarily due to significant reductions in Medigap 
premiums.  Premiums are projected to decline substantially because policies would cover a smaller 
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Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Supplemental 
Coverage and Change in Expected Out-of-Pocket Spending Under an 
Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Medigap Restrictions, 2013
24%
5%
71%
4% 4%
26%
11%
2%
41%
83%
36%
77%
5%
14%
11%14%
7%
21%
40%
3%Spending 
increase >$250
Spending 
increase <$250
No/nominal 
change
Spending 
reduction
Exhibit 11 
Number of 
beneficiaries:
Total FFS 
Medicare
40.8 million
Employer-sponsored 
insurance
15.9 million
Medigap
11.8 million
Medicare only
4.1 million
Medicaid
6.9 million
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. Employer includes TRICARE enrollees. 
No/minimal change group includes beneficiaries with changes in spending no greater than ±$25. Amounts may not total 100% due to rounding.
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
Distribution of Medigap Policyholders by Change in Expected 
Out-of-Pocket Spending, with and without Premiums, 2013
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Medigap Coverage Restrictions
1%
71%
5%
2%
11%
5%
84%
21%
Spending reduction No/nominal change Spending increase <$250 Spending increase >$250
Exhibit 12
Change in out-of-pocket 
costs for Medigap 
policyholders, including 
premiums and cost 
sharing
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. Out-of-pocket costs includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. No/minimal change group includes 
beneficiaries with changes in spending no greater than ±$25.
Change in out-of-pocket 
costs for Medigap 
policyholders, including 
cost sharing only 
(excluding premiums)
Percent with spending reduction, 
including premiums
Percent with spending increase >$250, 
excluding premiums
share of Medicare-covered claims 
and beneficiaries would use 
fewer services when faced with 
higher cost-sharing requirements 
(Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 11).  
 More than 8 million beneficiaries, 
or 20 percent of FFS beneficiaries, 
would be expected to see out-of-
pocket spending decrease by 
more than $250 in 2013 under 
the alternative benefit design 
with Medigap restrictions.  This 
group includes many beneficiaries 
in relatively good health who use 
few services, and many Medigap 
policyholders.  But nearly 6 
million Medicare beneficiaries in the FFS program (14 percent of those in the FFS program) would be 
expected to see out-of-pocket spending increase by more than $250 (with an average increase of $780 
each).  This group includes 2.5 million Medicare beneficiaries who are Medigap policyholders and 1.6 
million beneficiaries without supplemental coverage, 2.1 million beneficiaries in fair or poor health, 
and more than 3 million beneficiaries with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty level  (Appendix 
B-Tables 7  and 8).   
 Among Medigap policyholders alone, the changes in out-of-pocket spending relative to the alternative 
benefit design alone are even greater.  Without the restrictions on Medigap coverage, just 6 percent 
of Medigap enrollees would see a reduction in out-of-pocket costs, relative to current law.  With the 
Medigap restrictions, more than 7 in 10 (71 percent) of all Medigap policyholders would see a 
reduction in out-of-pocket costs, in large part due to a reduction in premiums.  Medigap premiums are 
expected to go down because Medigap would cover limited amounts of Medicare cost sharing; in 
addition, enrollees would take on a larger portion of Medicare cost sharing and are expected to use 
fewer services as a result, and therefore Medigap plans would be covering cost sharing for fewer 
Medicare-covered claims.    
o The distribution of 
beneficiaries with spending 
reductions and increases 
looks quite different 
depending on whether or not 
the out-of-pocket spending 
measure includes both cost 
sharing and premium 
changes or cost sharing only.  
If premiums are excluded 
from out-of-pocket spending, 
95 percent of Medigap 
enrollees would face an 
increase in out-of-pocket 
spending, 1 percent would 
face a decrease in spending, and 5 percent would face a nominal or no change (Exhibit 12).   
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Distribution of Medicare FFS Beneficiaries, by Medical Service Use 
and Change in Expected Out-of-Pocket Spending Under an 
Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Medigap Restrictions, 2013
24% 26% 22% 24%
48%
26% 23% 23% 26%
11%
36% 41%
25% 14%
11%
14% 11%
30% 37% 30%
Spending 
increase >$250
Spending 
increase <$250
No/nominal 
change
Spending 
reduction
Exhibit 13
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: FFS is fee-for-service. SNF is skilled nursing facility. Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements. 
No/nominal change group includes beneficiaries with changes in spending no more than ±$25. Users of hospitalization and SNF services are a 
subset of the 8.2 million beneficiaries with one or more hospitalization. Amounts may not total 100% due to rounding.
Number of 
beneficiaries:
Total FFS 
Medicare
40.8 million
Physician but no 
hospital services
29.6 million
One 
hospitalization 
5.8 million
Two or more 
hospitalizations
2.5 million
Hospitalization 
and SNF services
1.6 million
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
Net Change in Total Health Care Spending from Current Law 
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with and without 
Medigap Coverage Restrictions, 2013
Exhibit 14
SOURCE: Actuarial Research Corporation analysis for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
NOTES: Amounts may not sum to totals due to rounding.
Alternative benefit 
design
Alternative benefit 
design with Medigap 
restrictions
Federal – Total -$4.1 billion -$8.8 billion
Medicare -$4.2 -$8.8
Medicaid -$0.05 -$0.2
TRICARE $0.2 $0.2
Beneficiary – Total $2.3 -$1.5
Coinsurance $0.8 $10.3
Premiums $1.5 -$11.8
State Medicaid -$0.04 -$0.2
Employers $0.6 $0.6
Other supplemental insurers $0.4 $0.4
Total savings $4.3 billion $21.1 billion
Total spending $3.6 billion $11.6 billion
Net Change in Total Health Spending: $0.7 billion decrease $9.5 billion decrease
Alternative benefit design = $550 deductible, 20% coinsurance for all services, $5,500 cost-sharing limit
Overall, 61 percent of Medigap enrollees would face an increase in spending on cost sharing 
alone of $500 or more.   
 The expected change in beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs under the alternative benefit design with 
Medigap coverage restrictions is also largely driven by the Medicare-covered services they use 
(Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 13).  
o Combining the alternative 
benefit design with 
restrictions on Medigap 
coverage, a much smaller 
share of relatively healthy 
beneficiaries who use Part B 
services only (i.e., no 
hospitalizations), would 
experience an increase in 
costs than under the 
alternative Medicare benefit 
design alone (52 percent 
versus 78 percent).  This is 
because higher cost sharing 
for this group (mainly 
attributable to the unified 
deductible) would be more than offset by reductions in Medigap premiums.  
o Conversely, when combining the Medigap restrictions with the alternative benefit design, a 
larger share of beneficiaries who use inpatient hospital and post-acute SNF care would face 
higher out-of-pocket costs than without the Medigap restrictions (41 percent versus 26 
percent).  With the Medigap coverage restrictions, some of these high users would be 
responsible for a larger share of inpatient and SNF coinsurance than under current law or the 
restructured benefit design alone, which would likely outweigh any decrease in premiums they 
might otherwise experience. 
 
Impact on Total Health Care 
Spending  
By incorporating the restriction on 
Medigap coverage with the 
alternative benefit design, aggregate 
beneficiary spending would decrease, 
rather than increase as under the 
alternative benefit design alone, 
while Medicare spending and total 
health care spending would decrease 
even further than they would under 
the alternative benefit design alone 
(Exhibit 14).  The increased savings 
are largely attributable to a reduction 
in Medicare spending on Medicare-
covered services that would result 
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from a reduction in use by Medigap enrollees in response to increased exposure to cost sharing; this 
would result in lower Medigap premiums, as Medigap policies cover a substantially smaller share of 
enrollees’ total Medicare costs.   
 
Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket Spending.  Aggregate beneficiary spending would be expected to 
decrease by $1.5 billion in 2013 when Medigap restrictions are imposed in combination with the 
restructured Medicare benefit design.  In contrast, without the restrictions on first-dollar Medigap 
coverage, beneficiary spending would be expected to increase by $2.3 billion.  The aggregate reduction 
in beneficiary spending that is expected to occur with the restriction on Medigap first-dollar coverage is 
due to a significant reduction in Medigap premiums as enrollees become responsible for a larger share 
of the cost of Medicare-covered services, as well as the reduction in their use of services as a result; the 
total reduction in premiums is greater than the total increase in cost sharing that results from less 
generous Medigap policies.  In the aggregate, beneficiary premium spending would decrease by $11.8 
billion, while beneficiary cost sharing would increase by $10.3 billion. 
 
Federal Spending.  Federal spending would decrease by an estimated $8.8 billion in 2013 if the 
alternative Medicare benefit design were combined with restrictions on Medigap coverage – more than 
double the estimated $4.1 billion in federal savings under the alternative FFS benefit design alone.  The 
greater reduction in Medicare spending is due to reductions in utilization that would occur when 
beneficiaries with Medigap are faced with higher cost-sharing requirements.  
 
State Medicaid Spending.  Because Part B premiums are expected to decrease under the alternative 
benefit design in combination with Medigap restrictions, state Medicaid expenses (which cover dual 
eligibles’ premiums) would decrease by $0.2 billion in 2013, more than the $0.04 billion estimated under 
the restructured Medicare benefit without the Medigap restrictions.  
 
Employer Spending.  Employers would not be directly affected by the Medigap restrictions, and as a 
result, the combination of the restriction in Medigap coverage and the alternative FFS benefit design 
would have the same impact on employer spending as would the restructured benefit alone.  
 
Total Health Care Spending.  When Medigap restrictions are combined with a restructured Medicare 
benefit, total health care spending is projected to decrease by an estimated $9.5 billion in 2013, which 
primarily results from large reductions in Medicare spending and Medigap premiums, offset somewhat 
but not completely by higher beneficiary coinsurance payments.  This is substantially larger than the net 
reduction in total health care spending of $0.7 billion under the alternative Medicare benefit design 
alone.  The substantially larger total savings occurs when beneficiaries with Medigap scale back on 
utilization of Medicare-covered services in response to higher cost-sharing requirements in Medicare 
combined with restricted Medigap coverage, along with reductions in premiums paid by Medigap 
enrollees.  As noted earlier, however, this analysis does not explore the extent to which reductions in 
utilization could have an adverse impact on the health of beneficiaries if beneficiaries forego needed 
care, or lead to higher costs in the longer term as a result.  Further analysis looking at these offsetting 
costs of imposing higher cost sharing on elderly and disabled beneficiaries is needed before definitely 
concluding that this policy would result in a reduction in total (or federal) health care spending over the 
long term. 
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DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
 
Our analysis focuses on one of many possible ways to restructure the Medicare benefit design, based on 
proposals that have been considered in the context of reducing Medicare spending and the national 
deficit and debt.  Others have suggested alternative approaches to restructuring the Medicare benefit to 
achieve different policy objectives, including introducing more progressivity in the benefit design by 
providing less protection to higher-income beneficiaries and/or more protection to those with modest 
incomes, encouraging the use of higher-value services and discouraging the use of lower-value services 
through a value-based benefit design, and mitigating the need for private supplemental insurance by 
providing similar or better coverage as an option under Medicare. 
  
Below, we discuss some of these alternatives, the expected effects for beneficiaries and spending, and 
possible implementation challenges (where applicable).   
 
 Maintain the unified deductible and coinsurance, but income-relate the annual cost-sharing limit.  
This proposal would increase the progressivity of the alternative benefit design by imposing a higher 
out-of-pocket spending limit on beneficiaries with higher incomes and a lower limit on those with 
more modest incomes.  Such a design could lead to higher Medicare spending, however, depending 
on where the cost-sharing limits are set and how many beneficiaries ultimately reached the lower 
levels.  A variation of this approach, which would likely achieve somewhat greater savings than the 
alternative design modeled in our analysis, would be to raise the cost-sharing limit for higher-
income beneficiaries, and maintain the same limit for all others.  To implement income-related 
limits, several administrative issues would need to be addressed, such as how Medicare would 
determine the income of each beneficiary in order to implement the income-related limit and how 
employers and other supplemental insurers would administer an income-related wrap-around 
benefit.  
 
 Provide subsidies to protect low-income beneficiaries from new cost-sharing expenses.  Our 
analysis shows an increase in out-of-pocket spending for the majority of Medicare beneficiaries 
under the alternative benefit design, including many with low incomes.  Greater financial protection 
could be offered to low-income beneficiaries by adopting the approach used under the Medicare 
Part D prescription drug benefit that provides additional Medicare-funded subsidies to individuals 
with incomes below 150 percent of poverty and modest assets.  Such an approach could build on 
the current administrative structure already in place for determining eligibility.  An alternative 
approach could build upon current programs for full or partial dual eligibles, including those covered 
under the Medicare Savings Programs, that are jointly funded with federal and state Medicaid 
dollars.  The former approach would increase federal spending, possibly offsetting any federal 
savings that could otherwise be achieved under the alternative benefit design, and would 
potentially reduce Medicaid spending (assuming there is no “clawback” similar to Part D).  The latter 
approach would likely increase federal and state spending under Medicaid.  
 
 Apply the Medicare Part D “True Out-of-Pocket” (TrOOP) concept to the annual cost-sharing 
spending limit for services under Parts A and B.  Under Part D, the concept of TrOOP refers to 
counting out-of pocket spending on cost-sharing amounts paid (rather than incurred) by each 
beneficiary (and other designated payers) towards the prescription drug out-of-pocket spending 
limit, and excludes payments by employers (and some other third-party payers) on the beneficiary’s 
behalf.  If this concept were applied to the alternative benefit design, beneficiaries with employer-
sponsored retiree health benefits or other types of supplemental coverage would not reach the 
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cost-sharing limit until they themselves incurred $5,500 in out-of-pocket spending on cost sharing 
for Medicare-covered services.  If the TrOOP concept were adopted with the alternative benefit 
design and payers – primarily employers in this case – made no changes in their benefit design in 
response, this approach would likely increase Medicare savings relative to our estimate because 
beneficiaries with supplemental coverage would need to incur more spending before qualifying for 
the limit on out-of-pocket spending, when Medicare would begin paying 100 percent.  If 
supplemental insurers scaled back benefits, or terminated coverage in response – a more likely 
scenario – then Medicare spending and employer and other payer costs would likely be lower than 
our analysis suggests.  The impact on beneficiary spending would depend on the extent to which 
their supplemental coverage was scaled back, if not eliminated; their spending would likely be 
higher for cost sharing (which would induce lower Medicare spending), but this could be offset to 
some degree by lower or nonexistent supplemental insurance premiums.  To address concerns 
about employers scaling back or terminating retiree drug benefits, federal subsidies are provided to 
employers who continue to offer prescription drug coverage to their retirees that is comparable to 
Part D.   Further scrutiny would be needed to evaluate the interactions between this TrOOP policy 
and supplemental coverage if applied in conjunction with the alternative benefit design.   
 
 Impose a premium surcharge on beneficiaries who purchase first-dollar Medigap coverage, in 
conjunction with adopting the alternative benefit design.  Our analysis considers the effects of 
prohibiting first-dollar Medigap coverage in combination with the alternative benefit design.  The 
Obama Administration recently proposed a variation on the prohibition of first-dollar coverage that 
would impose a 30 percent Part B premium surcharge on new enrollees who purchase first-dollar 
Medigap coverage, beginning in 2017.27  By imposing a premium surcharge on first-dollar Medigap 
coverage, rather than an outright prohibition on such policies, the expected savings to Medicare are 
likely to be lower than under the approach we modeled because some policyholders would be 
expected to maintain first-dollar coverage, even at a higher premium.  If the premium surcharge 
were applied only to new enrollees, rather than current and new policyholders, the expected 
savings would be considerably lower.  Beneficiaries who chose to switch to less generous Medigap 
policies or traditional FFS Medicare with no supplemental coverage in response to the premium 
surcharge would be expected to use fewer services in response to higher cost-sharing obligations (as 
our model assumes is the case for those with no supplemental coverage under the alternative 
benefit design).    
 
 Maintain the existing Medicare FFS benefit structure, but provide a voluntary option to 
implement the new cost-sharing parameters.  In 2005, Karen Davis and colleagues proposed 
implementing an alternative benefit design similar to that which we modeled, but rather than 
modify the Medicare benefit design for all FFS enrollees, it would offered as a new and separate 
voluntary option, referred to as Medicare “Part E.”28  Any additional costs of this optional Part E 
would be financed entirely by a separate premium paid by beneficiaries who elected this coverage 
option.  Those who chose this option would receive all of their Medicare services under Part E, and 
would have a combined deductible, uniform coinsurance, and an annual cost-sharing limit.  The 
voluntary approach to an alternative benefit design would offer beneficiaries an opportunity to 
receive enhanced coverage only if they were willing to pay the premium, rather than imposing any 
higher out-of-pocket costs associated with an enhanced benefit design on all FFS enrollees.  Making 
such an option available under Medicare could also help to mitigate the need for private 
supplemental insurance.  A potential drawback of this option is the risk of adverse selection, 
whereby beneficiaries who expect to have relatively large expenses might be more likely to enroll in 
Part E because of the spending limit, which could undermine the fiscal sustainability of Part E.  This 
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issue could be addressed, as suggested by Davis and colleagues, by automatically enrolling 
beneficiaries in Part E but allowing them to opt-out, or by preventing Medigap plans from age-
adjusting premiums, a practice which might discourage relatively younger and healthier enrollees 
from choosing to sign up for Part E.   
 
 Establish “value-based” cost-sharing requirements.  Rather than imposing a uniform coinsurance 
amount for all Medicare-covered services, cost-sharing amounts for different types of services could 
be linked to evidence on their clinical and/or cost-effectiveness in order to encourage the use of 
evidence-based care or care that is of equal (if not greater) effectiveness but lower cost.  Medicare 
Part D plans, for example, use tiered cost sharing to encourage greater use of generic drugs as an 
alternative to therapeutically equivalent but more costly brand-name drugs.  The Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 took a step in this direction for Medicare FFS coverage by 
eliminating cost sharing for many Medicare-covered preventive services.  The implications for 
beneficiary and program spending of adopting other value-based benefit design elements would 
require further work to identify the specific services that might be considered high-value and low-
value and to determine the appropriate cost-sharing amounts to apply.   
 
 Modify the parameters discussed in this report.  Policymakers could choose to modify individual 
components of the benefit design – for example, increasing or decreasing the deductible amount, 
coinsurance rate, or cost-sharing limit – or to implement changes in a piecemeal fashion – for 
example, introducing cost sharing for home health services only.  An alternative approach to 
restructuring cost sharing would be to identify services where copayments could be charged, rather 
than coinsurance, adopting a type of cost sharing often used by Medicare Advantage plans.  
Depending on the parameters modified and the amounts chosen, the effects on beneficiaries and 
spending would vary somewhat or greatly from the effects presented in this report.     
 
Future modeling activities could help to illustrate the tradeoffs for beneficiaries and program spending 
associated with these and other alternative Medicare benefit designs, as well as the complexities that 
result from a majority of beneficiaries having supplemental insurance.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the midst of concerns about the size of the federal deficit and the national debt, the Medicare 
program has been the focus of much discussion and debate.  Several individuals and entities have 
proposed to incorporate significant Medicare savings as part of a broader package of proposals to 
reduce the federal budget deficit.  A wide range of ideas have been presented, some involving more 
fundamental reforms to the program than others.  Over the past year, for example, significant attention 
has been focused on proposals to transform Medicare to a system of premium supports (sometimes 
described as defined contributions or vouchers), raise the age of Medicare eligibility, and restructure 
cost-sharing requirements under the fee-for-service program.  Each of these options is estimated to 
reduce Medicare spending while shifting costs onto beneficiaries and other payers, and in some 
instances, would result in higher health care spending overall.  
 
Our analysis illustrates the shifts in costs that would be expected to occur if Medicare fee-for-service 
cost-sharing requirements are restructured in a manner that has been recommended by some as part of 
deficit-reduction efforts.  The results underscore a dilemma for policymakers:  a restructured Medicare 
benefit design with a new limit on beneficiary cost sharing for Medicare-covered services has the 
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potential to produce savings to Medicare and could provide substantial help to a small share of 
beneficiaries with relatively high medical costs.  At the same time, such a reform would likely impose 
additional costs on a majority of beneficiaries who are relatively healthy and modest users of medical 
care.  The direction and magnitude of spending or savings for individuals would depend on the services 
they use and their supplemental coverage.  The fact that the vast majority of beneficiaries currently 
have supplemental insurance complicates the analysis somewhat because these third-party payers often 
cover some or all of Medicare's cost-sharing requirements.  Thus, efforts to restructure the Medicare 
benefit design would not only affect beneficiaries' out-of-pocket spending on cost sharing and 
premiums, but also spending by employers and Medicaid.  
  
Our study does not address the health or long-term cost implications of imposing new cost-sharing 
requirements on beneficiaries.  Other studies have found that people forego both necessary and 
unnecessary care in response to higher cost-sharing obligations, the former of which could lead to long-
term health complications and costs.  Future research could consider the various ways in which the 
Medicare benefit design could be restructured to provide greater financial protections to beneficiaries in 
the fee-for-service program, to minimize the extent to which costs are shifted to other payers, and to 
potentially encourage greater use of relatively high value services.   
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APPENDIX A:  METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
Our primary data source was the 2006-2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), an annual survey 
of households and medical providers conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  
This dataset includes individual-level information on demographics, income, health status and 
conditions, use of medical care, health expenses, and insurance coverage for both nonelderly and 
elderly people.   Although MEPS includes beneficiaries who are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans, 
we excluded them from our analysis because these plans do not follow the standard Medicare cost-
sharing structure and the cost-sharing structure varies depending on the plan.  We supplemented our 
MEPS-based analysis with data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) – a nationally 
representative survey of Medicare beneficiaries sponsored by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services – to impute additional information where needed (e.g., SNF utilization and spending) and to 
validate some of our results (e.g., spending distribution by payer).   
 
For Medicare beneficiaries, we aligned the poverty distribution to conform to the CBO distribution of 
Part B enrollees by poverty status, and controlled counts of dual eligible to the current counts in the 
2011 Trustees report.29  We assigned beneficiaries to one of five supplemental coverage groups: 
Medicare only (no supplemental coverage), Medicaid (full and partial coverage combined), employer-
sponsored insurance (including TRICARE), Medigap, and other insurers (including Veterans’ 
Administration (VA), Indian Health Service and other federal sources; other state and local sources; 
Worker’s Compensation; and other unclassified/unknown sources).  The Federal Employees Health 
Benefit Program is not explicitly identified in MEPS.  For beneficiaries who listed more than one 
supplemental insurer, we assigned them to the source of coverage that they were enrolled in for the 
most number of months.   
 
The MEPS dataset itself does not include records for persons in long-term care facilities, who tend to 
incur relatively high Medicare spending attributable to inpatient hospital and skilled nursing facility use 
and many of whom are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.  However, the control totals from CBO 
for 2013 for population and spending do include the institutionalized.  As a result, total Medicare 
spending is spread over a distribution in the dataset that presumably has a slightly lower share of high-
cost cases, resulting in a slightly flatter expenditure distribution.  However, since all Medicare-covered 
spending is reflected in the total, it is unknown whether the effect on a given subgroup’s change in costs 
would be an increase or a decrease, and regardless it appears unlikely that the effect would be 
substantial. 
 
Calculating Out-of-Pocket Spending 
 
The analysis looks exclusively at spending associated with Medicare-covered services.  We excluded 
spending on non-Medicare covered services, such as dental, from the MEPS data prior to conducting the 
analysis.  We began by estimating, at the individual level, what share of Medicare-covered services 
would be covered by the beneficiary and what share would be covered by each payer under current law 
in 2013.  We have controlled the MEPS Medicare channel of payment (Medicare reimbursement) by 
service to data from the CBO March 2011 baseline for Medicare benefits spending (with refinements at 
the service and aged/disabled level where available from the 2011 Medicare Trustees report).  Total 
covered charges for each service in the record are then calculated based on the controlled Medicare 
reimbursement amount and the cost sharing for the service corresponding to the utilization data in the 
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record.30  In this way, spending for each record is limited to Medicare-covered services only.  The cost 
sharing (total covered charges minus Medicare spending) is distributed across the beneficiary and third-
party payers according to their respective shares of total cost sharing for that service.  To determine an 
individual’s out-of-pocket spending liability, we applied Medicare cost-sharing rules under current law to 
each beneficiary’s spending to divide the amount between Medicare and the beneficiary and/or their 
supplemental insurer.  Cost sharing was distributed among beneficiaries and supplemental insurers 
based on the actual distribution of spending at the record level, which reflects each individual’s source 
of supplemental coverage and the generosity of coverage.   
 
We then applied alternative cost-sharing requirements under the restructured benefit design to 
determine shifts in the amount and distribution of spending for Medicare, beneficiaries, and other 
payers.  (See the section beginning on page 29 for an example of how we model changes in the 
distribution of cost sharing under current law versus the alternative benefit design.)  We first calculated 
the impact of the new cost-sharing rules on each individual’s exposure to cost sharing holding utilization 
constant.  We also subject any increased cost sharing to the supplemental insurance the individual has, 
assuming insurers pay the same percentage of the new Medicare cost sharing that they pay under 
current-law cost sharing.  (We conducted sensitivity tests to determine the extent to which changes in 
supplemental coverage benefit rates would affect the distribution of beneficiaries paying more or less, 
and the average change in out-of-pocket spending, as described below under “Sensitivity Analysis”).  We 
then adjusted these calculations to account for changes in utilization and spending that would be 
expected to occur in response to cost-sharing changes, based on numerous studies showing that 
individuals tend to lower their use of care – and thereby their spending on health – when their exposure 
to cost sharing increases (and vice-versa).  To make this adjustment, we applied induction factors, which 
estimate how total expenses for a person would change in response to a change in cost sharing.  After 
applying these factors and determining the new spending levels for each beneficiary, we recalculated 
the share of spending covered by each payer. 
 
With regard to preventive services, we assumed that coinsurance under the alternative benefit design 
would be uniformly applied to all Medicare-covered benefits (except hospice), even though the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 provided for certain Medicare-covered preventive services to be available at 
no cost to beneficiaries, beginning in 2011.  However, MEPS does not classify services at a level refined 
enough to allow us to identify which services would qualify for no cost sharing, and as such we were 
unable to apply this provision of current law to our model of the alternative benefit design.  Had we 
been able to do so, the effect would have been to decrease the amount of beneficiary cost sharing from 
that which our model suggests.  But we do not believe that excluding cost sharing for these services 
would have had more than a small impact on our results. 
 
Because Medicaid is jointly-financed by the federal and state governments, we divided spending 
between the two payers based on current average spending patterns, with the federal government 
covering 57 percent of Medicaid spending on average and states covering the remaining 43 percent.   
 
Calculating Changes in Premiums 
 
Due to MEPS and other data limitations, we assumed that each type of payer (e.g., Medigap, employer-
sponsored insurance) charges the same premium to all of its enrollees under current law and would 
continue to do so under a restructured Medicare benefit design.  Our baseline Medigap premium 
estimate is in line with data on Medigap premiums from NAIC and Weiss Ratings.  We adopted a similar 
approach for employer-sponsored insurance premiums, using a different administrative expense load 
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and assuming employers would pick up half of the additional expenses, with the other half converted 
into a uniform premium.  The baseline employer premium amount was derived from private channel 
spending for employer-sponsored plan enrollees in the MEPS data controlled to CBO.  For example, we 
estimated total spending by Medigap plans on Medicare-covered services, derived an expected 
premium using current administrative expense loads and profit rates, and applied that premium to all 
Medigap enrollees.  In reality, Medigap (and other supplemental insurance) premiums can vary across 
plan types and other characteristics, such as enrollee age and geographic location.  It is important to 
note, however, that for the purposes of this report, our emphasis is on the magnitude of changes in out-
of-pocket spending (including premiums) comparing current law to the alternative benefit design, not 
the absolute levels themselves under either case. 
 
Medicare Part B premium.  Part B premiums are adjusted annually to cover 25 percent of the total 
predicted Part B costs for that year.  However, the actual amount of premiums paid by enrollees is 
complicated by issues such as the income-related premium.  We thus determined the Part B premium 
under future law by adjusting the total premiums paid from the CBO March 2011 Medicare Baseline by 
the change in Part B spending calculated by the model.  We used the same adjustment to CBO’s 
estimate for the federal share of premiums paid by Medicaid on behalf of beneficiaries dually eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid.  
 
Supplemental insurance premiums.  For supplemental insurance, we calculated premiums based on the 
insurers’ total spending on Medicare-covered services and related administrative expenses.    
 
 Medigap.  Medigap plans were assumed to set premiums in order to cover Medigap costs (including 
administrative expenses) as well as a constant rate of profit.  Thus, the Medigap premium was 
simply total Medigap expenses divided by the number of enrollees.   
 
 Employer-sponsored coverage.   Employers were assumed to cover half of their employees’ 
expenses.  The other half of expenses was converted into a uniform premium.   
 
 TRICARE, Medicaid, and other insurers.  We assumed no premiums for these groups.  TRICARE does 
not charge its enrollees a premium, and we assumed that Medicaid premiums would also be zero, as 
premiums are prohibited for most beneficiaries.  Finally, we assumed that other supplemental 
insurers do not charge a premium because this category is primarily VA, Worker’s Compensation, 
and other federal and state programs. 
  
We also assumed that each payer would incur administrative expenses for a given level of spending on 
health services.  For every dollar of spending, we assumed that payers would spend the following 
amounts on administrative costs: $0.014 or $0.015 for Medicare (for Part A or Part B respectively), $0.05 
for Medicaid, $0.25 for Medigap, $0.15 for employer-sponsored insurance, and $0.10 for TRICARE and 
other insurers.  These figures are based on the 2011 Trustees Report, CBO’s March 2011 Medicare 
Baseline, and NAIC data.   Because administrative expenses vary by payer, policy options that change the 
distribution of spending also change total administrative costs.  For instance, a policy that shifts 
spending from Medicare to Medigap plans would also increase administrative expenses because the 
latter spends more on administration than the former.   
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Adjustments to the Estimates 
 
We made the following adjustments to the data in our report: 
 We combined all individuals who would experience an increase or decrease in spending of up to $25 
with those who would experience no change in spending under the grouping “nominal/no change.” 
 We did not discuss or display estimates for subgroups under 300,000 people (weighted sample size 
corresponding to roughly 100 unweighted respondents in MEPS) due to the unreliability of small 
sample size estimation.  
 We rounded all dollar figures to the nearest $10 increment. 
 
Key Model Parameters, Assumptions and Limitations 
 
Efforts to model programmatic and policy reforms invariably require a number of assumptions and some 
degree of uncertainty.  The process of modeling the effects of a policy change for over 40 million 
Medicare beneficiaries requires policy and behavioral assumptions that may oversimplify individual 
decisions and responses, while averaging out variations in circumstances.  We nonetheless took this 
approach to develop a greater understanding of the possible effects of restructuring the Medicare 
benefit design on beneficiaries and spending.   
 
 Full implementation in 2013.  For the alternative Medicare benefit design with and without the 
Medigap first-dollar coverage restrictions, we modeled full implementation as of January 1, 2013, to 
more closely align our results with CBO estimates and the specifications of other policy proposals.   
 
 Parameters for the alternative benefit design and Medicare coverage restrictions.  We modeled the 
policy parameters that were specified by the CBO and are similar, for the most part, to the 
parameters used in recent proposals.  These reforms would not directly change the Medicare 
Advantage program or the Part D prescription drug benefit design. 
 
 Induction effects.  Drawing on prior research, particularly the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
(HIE), we assumed that a change in cost sharing would cause beneficiaries to use a different amount 
of care.  For example, increasing cost sharing would discourage beneficiaries from using as many 
services, which would in turn result in lower spending for beneficiaries and/or their insurers.  We 
modeled this effect using induction factors based on the RAND Health Insurance Experiment:  for 
every $1 increase in cost sharing, we assumed that total spending would decline by $0.70 for 
physician and outpatient services, by $0.50 for home health care, and by $0.20 for inpatient hospital 
and SNF services.   
 
 No change in Medicaid eligibility.  Medicaid currently pays all or a portion of Medicare’s cost sharing 
on behalf of beneficiaries who are enrolled in both programs.  Under the reform options, Medicare 
would displace Medicaid spending once a beneficiary reaches the cost-sharing limit.  We assumed 
that this would not cause states to change their Medicaid program’s eligibility criteria or coverage of 
benefits in the timeframe of our analysis.  If Medicaid programs did scale back coverage for optional 
populations over time, however, then our analysis would understate the effects for low-income 
beneficiaries, who could incur higher costs as a result.    
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 Static enrollment in Medigap supplemental policies.  We assumed that current enrollees in 
supplemental Medigap policies would retain their Medigap coverage under the alternative benefit 
design.  We made this assumption because there is no definitive evidence to suggest what the 
direction or magnitude of changes in Medigap coverage might be, and because our model produced 
results for a single year; it seemed unlikely that policyholders would respond to the change in 
benefit design by dropping their Medigap coverage in the same year that the new design took 
effect.  Over time, however, a restructured Medicare benefit design could make Medigap more or 
less appealing to beneficiaries, depending on the level of cost sharing required and the value set for 
the limit on out-of-pocket spending.  First-dollar coverage may be a large motivation for many 
people to purchase Medigap policies, and restrictions on that coverage could decrease Medigap 
enrollment over time.  Adding catastrophic protection to Medicare might also induce some 
beneficiaries to drop Medigap coverage, but with a limit of $5,500, some may continue to desire the 
financial protection offered by supplemental coverage.   Conversely, if Medigap premiums decline 
and if Medicare Advantage premiums rise, beneficiaries may choose to purchase or retain Medigap 
for peace of mind, even if the decision is not entirely economically rational.   
 
If current Medigap policyholders elected to drop their policies in 2013, our results could 
underestimate the savings to Medicare under the restructured benefit design, because exposure to 
higher cost sharing would be expected to result in lower utilization and Medicare spending.  The 
overall magnitude of such coverage changes and the effect they would have on beneficiaries’ out-of-
pocket spending (including premiums) and Medicare spending seem difficult to estimate with great 
confidence, in our view, in that much depends on beneficiaries’ individual preferences for bearing 
risk associated with having high out-of-pocket medical expenses and their willingness to pay 
premiums for less generous Medigap policies.  Given the risk-averse nature of the Medicare 
population and the general inertia associated with coverage decisions, as well as our focus on a one-
year timeframe, assuming static enrollment seemed reasonable for our analysis.  However, 
alternative assumptions of Medigap enrollment may be an area to explore in future research. 
 
 Static enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans.  Even though an alternative benefit design would 
affect the coverage offered by the Medicare FFS program and supplemental insurers, we assumed 
that this would not affect enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans in the one-year timeframe of our 
analysis.   
 
 No erosion of employer-sponsored or other supplemental coverage.  We assumed that supplemental 
payers would cover the same share of enrollees’ out-of-pocket spending liability (including 
premiums, if applicable) under the alternative benefit design that they do under the current FFS 
design, and that there would no change in employer offer rates or take-up rates by retirees under 
the restructured benefit design.  If, however, Medicare benefit restructuring were to prompt 
employers to drop retiree health benefits altogether, then retirees would likely incur higher out-of-
pocket costs, resulting in a decrease in Medicare spending.  The magnitude of the effect on 
employer spending would depend on how much employers erode coverage and how many 
employers do so.  If employers or other supplemental payers were to make changes in coverage by 
shifting some, if not all, of the additional cost-sharing requirements onto beneficiaries – and 
therefore no longer covering the same share of beneficiary spending as under current law – we 
would expect savings to supplemental insurers and higher costs for beneficiaries with this coverage, 
relative to the effects we observe (see discussion under “Sensitivity Analysis” below). 
 
RestRuctuRing MedicaRe’s Benefit design – Implications for Beneficiaries and Spending 27
 27 
 No effect on retirement decisions.  We assumed Medicare benefit design restructuring would not 
affect retirement decisions in the short term.  If changes in Medicare’s benefit design prompted 
workers to delay retirement, out-of-pocket spending could decline for younger workers (assuming 
their employer policies’ cost-sharing rules were more generous than the restructured Medicare 
benefit), and Medicare spending would decline somewhat (if Medicare was secondary payer rather 
than primary), but employer costs would rise.  
 
An important caveat to our results is that we only assess the financial effects on beneficiaries, and our 
single-year analysis does not consider or evaluate the health effects or long-term costs of the alternative 
Medicare benefit design.  Our model incorporates the assumption that as beneficiary cost sharing 
increases, beneficiaries would use fewer services, which would produce short-term savings for Medicare 
but which could also result in poor (or worse) health outcomes – thereby increasing costs to Medicare 
over the longer term.  It is outside the scope of our analysis to determine whether beneficiaries would 
forgo necessary or unnecessary services, and the extent to which this would affect their health or 
expenses over the longer term.  Two recent studies have suggested the existence of secondary (and 
unintended) effects of increased cost sharing in the Medicare program.  Trivedi and coauthors found 
that Medicare Advantage plans that nearly doubled copayments for ambulatory care experienced 
increases in hospitalizations, especially for enrollees with certain chronic conditions.31  Gruber and 
coauthors also found increases in hospitalizations after a large retiree health plan introduced 
copayments for physician services and increased copayments for pharmaceuticals.32  We also do not 
evaluate or incorporate any potential substitution effects that might offset certain reductions in 
utilization; for instance, beneficiaries who use fewer home health services because of the new 
coinsurance might use more physical therapy or physician visits.   
 
Based on the available evidence, it was not possible to model these longer-term effects with any degree 
of confidence, particularly since our estimates are based on a single year of implementation (specifically, 
2013).  As a result, our model may overestimate the amount of savings to Medicare that could result 
from increased cost sharing if the analysis were conducted over a multiple-year period – for instance, if 
beneficiaries simply substitute some types of care for other services, or if their health deteriorates, 
requiring additional care in the future – and underestimate the cost to beneficiaries associated with cost 
sharing for additional services used over the longer term.   These are important areas to explore in 
future research. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Variations in induction factors, by income.  Our analysis assumes that all beneficiaries would respond to 
a given change in cost sharing in the same way.  For example, we assume that for every $1 increase in 
inpatient cost sharing for a given beneficiary, any beneficiary would lower their use of care by some 
uniform amount, resulting in a $0.20 reduction in net inpatient spending by that individual (based on the 
induction factor we used).  However, research has shown that behavioral responses may vary depending 
on individual characteristics.  The RAND Health Insurance Experiment raised the possibility that lower-
income beneficiaries may respond to changes in cost sharing to a different degree than higher-income 
beneficiaries.  If this were the case, then our assumption of a uniform response regardless of income 
could underestimate the extent to which spending by low-income beneficiaries would decline in 
response to increased exposure to cost sharing and overestimate the change for beneficiaries with 
higher incomes. 
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To determine the magnitude of any possible bias in our results, we performed sensitivity analyses to test 
whether a differential income-related response would substantially affect our findings.  Specifically, we 
assessed the implications of using two different sets of induction factors: (1) induction factors ranging 
from 125 percent down to 80 percent of our original induction factors, based on income (with higher 
factors for those with lower incomes, corresponding to a greater response) and (2) induction factors 
ranging from 200 percent down to 50 percent, based on income. 
 
In both cases, introducing income-related induction factors had a relatively small impact on our results, 
both in the aggregate and in the distributions of beneficiaries with higher and lower spending.  One 
possible explanation for this result could be that, because cost-sharing restructuring would increase cost 
sharing by some beneficiaries and decrease cost sharing by others, the changes that would otherwise be 
observed upon using income-related induction factors are averaged out in the results.  Another 
possibility is that because supplemental insurance shields beneficiaries from large changes in cost 
sharing, and the majority of beneficiaries have such coverage, this moderates the differential effects 
that might otherwise be observed in different income groups.  In either case, the lack of a measureable 
income-related response bolsters our confidence in our original results.   
 
Variations in the share of benefits covered by supplemental insurers.   To test the sensitivity of our 
results to the assumption of no change in the benefit rate, we analyzed the effects of both increasing 
and decreasing the supplemental payer benefit rate on average out-of-pocket spending (including 
premiums) and on the distribution of beneficiaries who would pay less or more under the alternative 
benefit design.  (We assume no change in the Medicaid benefit rate for this analysis).  Sensitivity testing 
shows that changes in the benefit rate paid by supplemental insurers affect both average out-of-pocket 
spending changes and the distribution of those who would face increases and decreases in out-of-
pocket spending under the alternative benefit design.  However, modest shifts in the benefit rate paid 
by supplemental insurers (either increases or decreases) do not change the basic conclusions of our 
analysis under our original assumption of no change in the benefit rate.   
 
In general, reducing the share of benefits paid by supplemental insurers results in increases in average 
beneficiary out-of-pocket spending, relative to our baseline results, while increasing the share of 
benefits paid by supplemental insurers results in reductions in average out-of-pocket spending relative 
to the baseline.  The magnitude of changes in out-of-pocket spending depends on the level of variation 
in the benefit rate from our baseline assumption of no change.  With a 5 percent reduction in the 
benefit rate, average out-of-pocket spending among all FFS beneficiaries increases from $57 to $61, 
while a 5 percent increase in the benefit rate lowers average out-of-pocket spending from $57 to $56.  
(Because the estimates we present in this report are all rounded to the nearest $10 increment, these 
minimal changes in spending would not be observed since all estimates round to $60.) 
  
In terms of the distributional impacts, changes relative to our initial results are also relatively minor 
when making modest changes in the benefit rate.  For example, if the benefit rate changes by 5 percent, 
a majority of FFS beneficiaries continues to face higher out-of-pocket costs, although a somewhat 
smaller share than under our assumption of no change (falling from 71 percent down to 60 percent for a 
5 percent decrease in the benefit rate and down to 68 percent for a 5 percent increase) and the share 
with lower out-of-pocket spending increases, from 5 percent up to 9 percent with a 5 percent decrease 
in the benefit rate, or up to 6 percent with a 5 percent increase.  The reduction in the share of Medicare 
beneficiaries with higher spending when the benefit rate falls is likely due to a reduction in premiums 
and lower utilization associated with more costs shifted onto beneficiaries, as supplemental insurers 
cover less of an enrollee’s Medicare-covered costs.  The reduction in the share of beneficiaries with 
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higher spending when the benefit rate rises is likely a result of more generous coverage by supplemental 
insurers of the additional cost-sharing amounts.  
 
Changes in average out-of-pocket spending within the distribution are also generally modest.  Among 
the majority of beneficiaries who would face higher out-of-pocket spending, the average increase goes 
up from $180 to $200 if the benefit rate rises by 5 percent, and from $180 to $220 if the benefit rate 
falls by 5 percent.  Among those who would see decreases in out-of-pocket costs with a change in the 
benefit rate, the average decrease goes down from $1,570 to $1,320 with a 5 percent increase in the 
benefit rate, and from $1,570 to $850 with a 5 percent decrease in the benefit rate.  The relatively large 
drop in savings for the latter group is largely due to lower average savings among those who shift into 
this group.  
 
Example of How We Model Changes in the Distribution of Cost Sharing under Current Law 
Versus the Alternative Benefit Design  
 
This example is overly simplified, since we ignore the effects of induction as well as any lab or outpatient 
mental health services this person may use (which are subject to 0 percent and 35 percent coinsurance 
under current law, respectively). 
 
Suppose we have a record for a Medicare beneficiary enrolled in an employer-sponsored retiree health 
plan who has one inpatient stay under 60 days and some physician spending.  Under current law, the 
total costs for these services are distributed among payers as follows: 
 
 Total Medicare OOP Private 
Inpatient $10,500 $9,328 $586 $586 
Physician $3,500 $2,675.20 $82.48 $742.32 
TOTAL $14,000 $12,003.20 $668.48 $1,328.3 
 
For inpatient services, this person is responsible for the inpatient deductible ($1,172), which the MEPS 
record tells us is split evenly between OOP and Private ($586 each).  For physician, the cost sharing is 
($3,500 - $156) * 0.2 + $156 = $824.80, of which MEPS tells us the person pays 10 percent ($82.48) and 
the employer plan pays the rest. 
 
Under the alternative benefit design, we add the inpatient and physician total covered charges together 
($14,000).  Inpatient spending is 75 percent of that total, and physician spending is 25 percent.  We split 
the deductible amount pro-rata between those two services ($550 * 0.75 = $412.50 for inpatient and 
$550 * 0.25 = $137.50 for physician) to calculate the portion beyond the deductible which is subject to 
the 20 percent coinsurance for each service: 
 
For inpatient services, we calculate: 
(Inpatient covered charges - inpatient share of deductible) * 0.2 + inpatient share of deductible 
($10,500 - $412.50) * 0.2 + $412.50 = $2,430 cost sharing 
 
Similarly, for physician services, we calculate: 
($3,500 - $137.50) * 0.2 + $137.50 = $810 cost sharing. 
 
Note that the total cost sharing, $2,430 + $810 = $3,240, is equal to applying the cost sharing to the 
person's total spending across services: ($14,000 - $550) * 0.2 + $550 = $3,240.  This method allows us 
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to determine roughly what portion of cost sharing goes to each service, which allows us to retain the 
underlying cost-sharing distributions for each service as well as apply induction separately by service. 
 
For inpatient, the total cost sharing is then split evenly, as under current law, between OOP and Private 
($1,215 each), and for physician, 10 percent ($81) of the cost sharing is presumed to be OOP.  Thus, 
under the alternative benefit design, the total costs would be distributed among payers as follows: 
 
 Total Medicare OOP Private 
Inpatient $10,500 $8,070 $1,215 $1,215 
Physician $3,500 $2,690 $81 $729 
TOTAL $14,000 $10,760 $1,296 $1,944 
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APPENDIX B:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design on Medicare Fee-for-Service 
Beneficiaries, By Change in Out-of-Pocket Spending and Characteristics, 2013 
 Number of FFS Beneficiaries (in millions) Percentage of FFS Beneficiaries Average Change in Spending 
 All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Increase 
(>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Overall 40.8 29.1 2.0 9.8 71% 5% 24% $60 $180 -$1,570 $10 
Health status1            
Excellent 5.8 4.6 0.1 1.1 79% 1% 19% $90 $140 -- $10 
Very good 10.2 8.0 0.3 1.9 78% 3% 19% $100 $150 -$830 $10 
Good 11.8 8.6 0.4 2.8 73% 3% 24% $70 $160 -$1,350 $10 
Fair 7.2 4.5 0.5 2.2 62% 7% 31% $40 $210 -$1,280 $0 
Poor 3.5 1.9 0.3 1.2 55% 9% 36% -$90 $280 -$2,650 $0 
Utilization             
No use 2.9 1.1 0.0 1.8 37% 0% 63% $30 $60 -- $10 
Part B only 29.6 23.2 0.2 6.2 78% 1% 21% $80 $140 -- $10 
1 hospital stay 5.8 3.6 1.0 1.2 63% 17% 20% $70 $440 -$1,180 $0 
2+ hospital 
stay 2.5 1.1 0.7 0.6 46% 30% 24% -$160 $330 -$1,020 $0 
Hospital stay, 
no SNF 6.6 4.3 0.7 1.6 65% 11% 24% $140 $390 -$1,140 $0 
Hospital and 
SNF stay  1.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 26% 63% 11% -$540 $580 -$1,090 -- 
Supplemental 
insurance            
Employer 15.9 13.9 0.7 1.3 87% 4% 8% $90 $150 -$980 $10 
Medigap 11.8 11.0 0.7 0.1 93% 6% 1% $80 $140 -$800 -- 
Medicaid 6.9 1.0 0.3 5.7 14% 4% 83% $10 $200 -- $0 
Other 2.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 48% 5% 47% $70 $390 -- $10 
None 4.1 2.3 0.2 1.6 56% 4% 40% -$20 $560 -- $10 
Income (as % of 
FPL)            
<= 100% 8.1 3.1 0.3 4.7 38% 4% 58% -$40 $240 -$3,250 $0 
100-133% 5.5 3.5 0.3 1.6 64% 6% 30% $80 $230 -$1,250 $10 
133-200% 7.1 5.4 0.4 1.3 76% 6% 18% $80 $220 -$1,510 $10 
200-300% 5.3 4.3 0.2 0.8 81% 4% 15% $80 $180 -- $10 
300-400% 3.5 3.0 0.1 0.3 86% 4% 10% $90 $180 -- $10 
400%+ 11.4 9.8 0.6 1.0 86% 5% 9% $80 $140 -$820 $10 
Age            
<65 7.5 3.7 0.3 3.5 49% 4% 47% -$20 $300 -$3,700 $0 
65-74 17.3 13.1 0.7 3.4 76% 4% 20% $70 $150 -$1,130 $10 
75-84 11.4 8.7 0.6 2.1 76% 5% 19% $70 $170 -$1,110 $10 
85+ 4.6 3.6 0.3 0.7 78% 7% 16% $90 $220 -$1,190 $10 
Gender            
Male 18.2 12.8 0.9 4.4 71% 5% 24% $40 $190 -$2,020 $10 
Female 22.6 16.2 1.1 5.3 72% 5% 24% $70 $180 -$1,190 $0 
Race/ethnicity2            
White 32.4 25.0 1.6 5.9 77% 5% 18% $60 $180 -$1,550 $10 
Hispanic 2.5 1.0 0.1 1.4 40% 4% 56% $50 $200 -- $0 
Black 4.0 2.2 0.2 1.6 54% 5% 41% $10 $210 -- $0 
MSA3            
Rural 9.4 6.6 0.4 2.4 71% 4% 25% $70 $170 -$1,350 $10 
Urban 29.5 21.3 1.3 7.0 72% 4% 24% $60 $180 -$1,540 $10 
NOTE:  ‘--' Indicates estimate not displayed due to small sample size.  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing 
requirements.  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  
MSA is metropolitan statistical area. 
1 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
2 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
3 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown.  
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TABLE 2:  Distribution of Medicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries By Changes in Out-of-Pocket 
Spending Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design, By Characteristics, 2013 
 
Number of FFS 
beneficiaries  
(in millions) 
Increase greater 
than $250 
Increase less 
than $250 
Nominal or no 
change (<±$25) 
Decrease less 
than -$250 
Decrease greater 
than -$250 
Overall 40.8 12% 60% 24% 1% 3% 
Health status1       
Excellent 5.8 10% 69% 19% 1% 1% 
Very good 10.2 10% 68% 19% 1% 2% 
Good 11.8 11% 62% 24% 1% 3% 
Fair 7.2 13% 49% 31% 3% 4% 
Poor 3.5 15% 40% 36% 3% 6% 
Utilization        
No use 2.9 0% 37% 63% 0% 0% 
Part B only 29.6 12% 66% 21% 0% 0% 
1 hospital stay 5.8 15% 47% 20% 5% 12% 
2+ hospital stay 2.5 11% 35% 24% 8% 22% 
Hospital stay, no SNF 6.6 15% 50% 24% 5% 5% 
Hospital and SNF stay  1.6 10% 16% 11% 7% 56% 
Supplemental insurance       
Employer 15.9 10% 77% 8% 2% 3% 
Medigap 11.8 8% 84% 1% 2% 5% 
Medicaid 6.9 3% 11% 83% 1% 2% 
Other 2.1 16% 32% 47% 1% 4% 
None 4.1 42% 14% 40% 0% 4% 
Income (as % of FPL)       
<= 100% 8.1 8% 30% 58% 1% 3% 
100-133% 5.5 15% 50% 30% 1% 5% 
133-200% 7.1 14% 61% 18% 2% 4% 
200-300% 5.3 14% 68% 15% 1% 3% 
300-400% 3.5 12% 74% 10% 1% 3% 
400%+ 11.4 10% 76% 9% 2% 3% 
Age       
<65 7.5 14% 35% 47% 1% 3% 
65-74 17.3 10% 66% 20% 1% 3% 
75-84 11.4 11% 65% 19% 1% 4% 
85+ 4.6 16% 62% 16% 1% 6% 
Gender       
Male 18.2 12% 59% 24% 1% 4% 
Female 22.6 12% 60% 24% 1% 3% 
Race/ethnicity2       
White 32.4 12% 65% 18% 1% 4% 
Hispanic 2.5 7% 33% 56% 1% 3% 
Black 4.0 12% 42% 41% 2% 4% 
MSA3       
Rural 9.4 12% 59% 25% 1% 3% 
Urban 29.5 12% 60% 24% 1% 3% 
NOTE:  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements.  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-
service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  MSA is metropolitan statistical area. 
1 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
2 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
3 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown. 
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TABLE 3:  Impact of Different Cost-Sharing Limits in an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design on 
Medicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries, by Change in Out-of-Pocket Spending, 2013 
 Number of FFS Beneficiaries  (in millions) Percent of FFS Beneficiaries Average Change in Spending 
 Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Increase 
(>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Cost-Sharing Limit:           
$5,500  29.1 2.0 9.8 71% 5% 24% $60 $180 -$1,570 $10 
$4,000 15.2 12.4 13.2 37% 30% 32% -$60 $200 -$450 $0 
$7,500 29.5 1.4 10.0 72% 3% 24% $180 $320 -$1,580 $0 
NOTE:  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements.  FFS is fee-for-service.   
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TABLE 4:  Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with a $4,000 Cost-Sharing Limit 
on Medicare Fee-For-Service Beneficiaries, By Change in Out-of-Pocket Spending and 
Characteristics, 2013 
 Number of FFS Beneficiaries (in millions) Percentage of FFS Beneficiaries Average Change in Spending 
 All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Increase 
(>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Overall 40.8 15.2 12.4 13.2 37% 30% 32% -$60 $200 -$450 $0 
Health status1            
Excellent 5.8 2.2 1.6 2.0 38% 28% 34% -$10 $140 -$230 $0 
Very good 10.2 4.0 3.0 3.1 39% 30% 31% -$20 $150 -$270 $0 
Good 11.8 4.4 3.6 3.9 37% 30% 33% -$40 $180 -$340 $0 
Fair 7.2 2.6 2.2 2.4 36% 31% 34% -$80 $230 -$520 $0 
Poor 3.5 1.3 1.0 1.2 36% 29% 35% -$230 $270 -$1,120 $0 
Utilization             
No use 2.9 1.2 0.3 1.3 42% 12% 46% -$10 $40 -180 $0 
Part B only 29.6 12.1 7.8 9.7 41% 26% 33% -$20 $160 -$320 $0 
1 hospital stay 5.8 1.5 2.7 1.5 26% 47% 27% -$180 $570 -$710 $0 
2+ hospital 
stay 2.5 0.3 1.5 0.6 14% 61% 25% -$410 $380 -$750 $0 
Hospital stay, 
no SNF 6.6 1.7 2.9 1.9 26% 45% 29% -$80 $510 -$490 $0 
Hospital and 
SNF stay  1.6 0.1 1.3 0.2 9% 78% 14% -$920 -- -$1,270 -- 
Supplemental 
insurance            
Employer 15.9 7.6 1.3 7.0 48% 8% 44% $10 $140 -$740 $0 
Medigap 11.8 0.8 10.5 0.5 7% 89% 4% -$190 $330 -$240 $0 
Medicaid 6.9 0.9 0.3 5.7 13% 4% 83% $0 $170 -- $0 
Other 2.1 1.9 0.1 0.0 94% 6% 1% $20 $190 -- -- 
None 4.1 3.9 0.2 0.0 95% 5% 0% -$120 $290 -- -- 
Income  
(as % of FPL)            
<= 100% 8.1 2.1 1.4 4.5 26% 18% 56% -$110 $230 -$960 $0 
100-133% 5.5 2.0 1.9 1.6 36% 35% 30% -$70 $240 -$450 $0 
133-200% 7.1 2.8 2.7 1.5 40% 38% 21% -$70 $240 -$440 $0 
200-300% 5.3 2.4 1.8 1.1 45% 33% 22% -$40 $180 -$360 $0 
300-400% 3.5 1.4 1.1 1.0 40% 32% 28% -$50 $180 -$380 $0 
400%+ 11.4 4.5 3.5 3.4 39% 31% 30% -$40 $150 -$320 $0 
Age            
<65 7.5 3.2 0.9 3.4 43% 12% 45% -$100 $230 -$1,720 $0 
65-74 17.3 6.7 5.0 5.6 39% 29% 33% -$40 $160 -$360 $0 
75-84 11.4 3.8 4.5 3.1 33% 40% 27% -$70 $200 -$340 $0 
85+ 4.6 1.5 2.0 1.1 32% 43% 24% -$80 $300 -$400 $0 
Gender            
Male 18.2 7.2 4.9 6.0 40% 27% 33% -$80 $190 -$580 $0 
Female 22.6 7.9 7.5 7.2 35% 33% 32% -$50 $200 -$370 $0 
Race/ethnicity2            
White 32.4 12.2 11.1 9.1 38% 34% 28% -$70 $190 -$420 $0 
Hispanic 2.5 0.8 0.4 1.4 30% 16% 55% -$10 $190 -$450 $0 
Black 4.0 1.5 0.6 1.9 37% 16% 47% -$60 $210 -$890 $0 
MSA3            
Rural 9.4 3.7 3.0 2.7 40% 32% 29% -$50 $180 -$380 $0 
Urban 29.5 10.9 8.6 10.0 37% 29% 34% -$50 $190 -$430 $0 
NOTE:  ‘--' Indicates estimate not displayed due to small sample size.  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing 
requirements.  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  
MSA is metropolitan statistical area. 
1 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
2 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
3 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown.  
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TABLE 5:  Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with a $7,500 Cost-Sharing Limit 
on Medicare Fee-For-Service Beneficiaries, By Change in Out-of-Pocket Spending and 
Characteristics, 2013 
 Number of FFS Beneficiaries (in millions) Percentage of FFS Beneficiaries Average Change in Spending 
 All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Increase 
(>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Overall 40.8 29.5 1.4 10.0 72% 3% 24% $180 $320 -$1,580 $0 
Health status1            
Excellent 5.8 4.6 0.1 1.2 79% 1% 21% $190 $260 -- $0 
Very good 10.2 8.0 0.2 2.0 79% 2% 19% $210 $280 -- $0 
Good 11.8 8.7 0.3 2.8 74% 2% 24% $180 $290 -- $0 
Fair 7.2 4.7 0.3 2.2 65% 4% 31% $170 $350 -$1,360 $0 
Poor 3.5 2.0 0.2 1.3 57% 7% 36% $50 $450 -- $0 
Utilization 
profiles            
No use 2.9 1.1 0.0 1.8 37% 0% 63% $60 $170 -- -$10 
Part B only 29.6 22.9 0.1 6.6 77% 0% 22% $170 $260 -- $0 
1 hospital stay 5.8 4.0 0.7 1.1 69% 12% 19% $330 $650 -$1,050 $0 
2+ hospital 
stay 2.5 1.4 0.6 0.5 57% 23% 19% $120 $570 -$870 $0 
Hospital stay, 
no SNF 6.6 4.8 0.4 1.4 73% 6% 21% $360 $620 -$1,530 $0 
Hospital and 
SNF stay 1.6 0.6 0.9 0.2 38% 52% 10% -$100 $720 -$710 -- 
Supplemental 
insurance            
Employer 15.9 14.1 0.5 1.4 88% 3% 9% $160 $220 -$970 -$10 
Medigap 11.8 11.4 0.4 0.0 96% 4% 0% $340 $370 -$630 -- 
Medicaid 6.9 1.0 0.2 5.7 14% 3% 83% $20 $230 -- $0 
Other 2.1 0.8 0.1 1.2 38% 5% 57% $130 $590 -- $0 
None 4.1 2.3 0.1 1.7 55% 4% 41% $90 $670 -- -$10 
Income  
(as % of FPL)            
<= 100% 8.1 3.1 0.3 4.7 39% 3% 58% $30 $370 -- $0 
100-133% 5.5 3.6 0.3 1.6 66% 5% 29% $230 $410 -- $0 
133-200% 7.1 5.5 0.3 1.3 78% 4% 19% $230 $370 -- $0 
200-300% 5.3 4.3 0.1 0.9 81% 2% 16% $200 $310 -- $0 
300-400% 3.5 3.0 0.1 0.4 87% 3% 10% $250 $320 -- -$10 
400%+ 11.4 9.9 0.4 1.1 87% 3% 9% $200 $260 -$700 -$10 
Age            
<65 7.5 3.6 0.2 3.7 48% 3% 49% $70 $430 -- $0 
65-74 17.3 13.3 0.5 3.5 77% 3% 20% $180 $280 -$1,060 $0 
75-84 11.4 8.8 0.4 2.2 78% 3% 19% $210 $330 -$1,080 $0 
85+ 4.6 3.7 0.2 0.7 80% 5% 15% $260 $380 -- $0 
Gender            
Male 18.2 13.0 0.7 4.5 71% 4% 25% $160 $330 -$2,160 $0 
Female 22.6 16.5 0.7 5.4 73% 3% 24% $200 $320 -$1,060 $0 
Race/ethnicity2            
White 32.4 25.3 1.1 6.0 78% 3% 19% $200 $320 -$1,560 $0 
Hispanic 2.5 1.0 0.1 1.4 41% 3% 56% $110 $320 -- $0 
Black 4.0 2.2 0.2 1.6 55% 4% 41% $90 $310 -- $0 
MSA3            
Rural 9.4 6.7 0.3 2.4 71% 3% 26% $180 $300 -- $0 
Urban 29.5 21.6 0.8 7.1 73% 3% 24% $180 $320 -$1,720 $0 
NOTE:  ‘--' Indicates estimate not displayed due to small sample size.  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing 
requirements.  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  
MSA is metropolitan statistical area. 
1 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
2 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
3 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown.  
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TABLE 6:  Share of Medicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries Reaching the Cost-Sharing Limit 
Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Different Cost-Sharing Limits and with 
Medigap Coverage Restrictions, By Characteristics, 2013 
  Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with: 
 
Number of FFS 
beneficiaries  
(in millions) 
$5,500  
cost-sharing 
limit 
$4,000  
cost-sharing 
limit 
$4,815  
cost-sharing 
limit1 
$7,500  
cost-sharing 
limit 
Medigap 
coverage 
restrictions 
Overall 40.8 12% 16% 14% 9% 12% 
Health Status2       
Excellent 5.8 3% 4% 4% 2% 3% 
Very good 10.2 6% 8% 7% 4% 6% 
Good 11.8 9% 13% 10% 7% 9% 
Fair 7.2 17% 23% 19% 13% 17% 
Poor 3.5 27% 36% 30% 21% 26% 
Utilization       
No use 2.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Part B only 29.6 2% 5% 3% 1% 2% 
1 hospital stay 5.8 40% 54% 46% 28% 39% 
2+ hospital stay 2.5 77% 88% 81% 65% 77% 
Hospital stay, no SNF 6.6 42% 56% 47% 29% 42% 
Hospital and SNF stay  1.6 85% 95% 93% 79% 85% 
Supplemental insurance       
Employer 15.9 11% 15% 13% 8% 11% 
Medigap 11.8 15% 19% 17% 11% 14% 
Medicaid 6.9 12% 17% 14% 10% 12% 
Other 2.1 10% 16% 12% 7% 10% 
None 4.1 11% 15% 12% 9% 11% 
Income (as % of FPL)       
<= 100% 8.1 13% 17% 15% 11% 13% 
100-133% 5.5 15% 20% 17% 11% 14% 
133-200% 7.1 14% 18% 16% 11% 14% 
200-300% 5.3 8% 13% 11% 6% 8% 
300-400% 3.5 10% 15% 12% 8% 10% 
400%+ 11.4 10% 14% 12% 7% 10% 
Age       
<65 7.5 11% 15% 12% 9% 11% 
65-74 17.3 10% 13% 11% 8% 10% 
75-84 11.4 14% 18% 15% 10% 14% 
85+ 4.6 18% 25% 22% 13% 17% 
Gender       
Male 18.2 12% 16% 14% 10% 12% 
Female 22.6 12% 16% 14% 9% 11% 
Race/ethnicity3       
White 32.4 12% 17% 14% 9% 12% 
Hispanic 2.5 10% 13% 10% 8% 10% 
Black 4.0 13% 17% 15% 11% 13% 
MSA4       
Rural 9.4 10% 14% 12% 7% 10% 
Urban 29.5 11% 15% 13% 8% 11% 
NOTE:  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  MSA is 
metropolitan statistical area. 
1 This out-of-pocket limit would be budget-neutral to Medicare in 2013. 
2 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
3 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
4 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown.  
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TABLE 7:  Impact of an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Medigap Coverage 
Restrictions on Medicare Fee-For-Service Beneficiaries, By Change in Out-of-Pocket Spending 
and Characteristics, 2013 
 Number of FFS Beneficiaries (in millions) Percentage of FFS Beneficiaries Average Change in Spending 
 All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Increase 
(>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
All Increase (>$25) 
Decrease 
(>-$25) 
Nominal 
or no 
change 
(<±$25) 
Overall 40.8 20.5 9.8 10.5 50% 24% 26% -$50 $280 -$780 $0 
Health status1            
Excellent 5.8 2.9 1.7 1.2 50% 29% 21% -$120 $160 -$700 $0 
Very good 10.2 5.3 2.8 2.1 52% 27% 20% -$80 $190 -$650 $0 
Good 11.8 6.0 2.8 3.0 51% 24% 25% -$30 $240 -$660 $0 
Fair 7.2 3.4 1.5 2.3 48% 21% 32% $20 $360 -$760 $0 
Poor 3.5 1.6 0.6 1.3 45% 17% 38% -$80 $450 -$1,630 $0 
Utilization             
No use 2.9 0.7 0.3 1.8 26% 12% 63% -$120 $30 -$1,060 -$10 
Part B only 29.6 15.3 7.6 6.8 52% 26% 23% -$100 $170 -$730 $0 
1 hospital stay 5.8 3.2 1.3 1.3 55% 22% 23% $180 $690 -$890 $0 
2+ hospital 
stay 2.5 1.3 0.6 0.6 51% 24% 26% $140 $770 -$1,040 $0 
Hospital stay, 
no SNF 6.6 3.7 1.1 1.8 57% 16% 27% $260 $710 -$860 $0 
Hospital and 
SNF stay  1.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 41% 48% 11% -$200 $750 -$1,050 -- 
Supplemental 
insurance            
Employer 15.9 13.4 0.8 1.7 84% 5% 11% $60 $120 -$850 -$10 
Medigap 11.8 3.2 8.4 0.3 27% 71% 2% -$230 $750 -$610 -- 
Medicaid 6.9 1.0 0.3 5.7 14% 4% 83% $10 $200 -- $0 
Other 2.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 36% 6% 58% $40 $480 -- -$10 
None 4.1 2.2 0.2 1.7 55% 4% 41% -$50 $550 -- -$10 
Income  
(as % of FPL)            
<= 100% 8.1 2.3 1.1 4.8 28% 13% 59% -$80 $370 -$1,410 $0 
100-133% 5.5 2.3 1.4 1.7 42% 26% 31% -$20 $400 -$710 $0 
133-200% 7.1 3.6 2.1 1.5 50% 29% 21% -$40 $370 -$760 -$10 
200-300% 5.3 2.9 1.5 0.9 55% 27% 18% -$50 $270 -$700 -$10 
300-400% 3.5 2.2 0.9 0.4 63% 26% 12% -$40 $240 -$730 -$10 
400%+ 11.4 7.3 2.9 1.2 64% 25% 11% -$40 $190 -$650 -$10 
Age            
<65 7.5 3.1 0.8 3.7 41% 10% 49% -$70 $330 -$2,010 $0 
65-74 17.3 9.5 4.2 3.6 55% 24% 21% -$50 $210 -$710 $0 
75-84 11.4 5.6 3.4 2.4 49% 30% 21% -$50 $300 -$640 $0 
85+ 4.6 2.3 1.4 0.8 51% 31% 18% $10 $440 -$670 $0 
Gender            
Male 18.2 9.5 3.9 4.8 52% 22% 26% -$70 $270 -$950 $0 
Female 22.6 11.0 5.9 5.8 49% 26% 25% -$30 $300 -$670 $0 
Race/ethnicity2            
White 32.4 17.2 8.7 6.5 53% 27% 20% -$50 $290 -$750 $0 
Hispanic 2.5 0.8 0.3 1.4 31% 12% 57% $0 $270 -$660 $0 
Black 4.0 1.8 0.5 1.7 45% 13% 42% -$50 $250 -$1,170 $0 
MSA3            
Rural 9.4 4.5 2.5 2.5 48% 26% 26% -$60 $260 -$720 $0 
Urban 29.5 15.1 6.9 7.5 51% 23% 26% -$40 $260 -$760 $0 
NOTE:  ‘--' Indicates estimate not displayed due to small sample size.  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing 
requirements.  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  
MSA is metropolitan statistical area. 
1 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
2 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
3 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown. 
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TABLE 8:  Distribution of Medicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries By Change In Out-of-Pocket 
Spending Under an Alternative Medicare Benefit Design with Medigap Coverage Restrictions, 
By Characteristics, 2013 
 
Number of FFS 
beneficiaries 
(in millions) 
Increase greater 
than $250 
Increase less 
than $250 
Nominal or no 
change (<±$25) 
Decrease less 
than -$250 
Decrease greater 
than -$250 
Overall 40.8 14% 36% 26% 4% 20% 
Health status1       
Excellent 5.8 7% 43% 21% 3% 26% 
Very good 10.2 10% 43% 20% 3% 24% 
Good 11.8 14% 37% 25% 4% 20% 
Fair 7.2 19% 28% 32% 5% 15% 
Poor 3.5 21% 24% 38% 4% 13% 
Utilization        
No use 2.9 0% 26% 63% 0% 12% 
Part B only 29.6 11% 41% 23% 2% 23% 
1 hospital stay 5.8 30% 25% 23% 10% 12% 
2+ hospital stay 2.5 37% 14% 26% 8% 16% 
Hospital stay, no SNF 6.6 33% 24% 27% 9% 8% 
Hospital and SNF stay  1.6 30% 11% 11% 13% 35% 
Supplemental insurance       
Employer 15.9 7% 77% 11% 2% 3% 
Medigap 11.8 21% 5% 2% 8% 63% 
Medicaid 6.9 3% 11% 83% 1% 2% 
Other 2.1 15% 21% 58% 2% 4% 
None 4.1 40% 14% 41% 0% 4% 
Income (as % of FPL)       
<= 100% 8.1 10% 18% 59% 2% 11% 
100-133% 5.5 19% 24% 31% 4% 22% 
133-200% 7.1 19% 31% 21% 5% 24% 
200-300% 5.3 15% 40% 18% 4% 23% 
300-400% 3.5 14% 48% 12% 3% 22% 
400%+ 11.4 11% 53% 11% 4% 22% 
Age       
<65 7.5 14% 27% 49% 2% 8% 
65-74 17.3 11% 44% 21% 3% 21% 
75-84 11.4 16% 33% 21% 4% 26% 
85+ 4.6 22% 29% 18% 6% 26% 
Gender       
Male 18.2 14% 39% 26% 3% 19% 
Female 22.6 15% 34% 25% 4% 22% 
Race/ethnicity2       
White 32.4 15% 38% 20% 4% 23% 
Hispanic 2.5 9% 22% 57% 2% 10% 
Black 4.0 12% 32% 42% 3% 11% 
MSA3       
Rural 9.4 14% 33% 26% 3% 23% 
Urban 29.5 13% 38% 26% 4% 20% 
NOTE:  Out-of-pocket spending includes premiums and cost-sharing requirements.  Employer group includes TRICARE enrollees.  FFS is fee-for-
service.  SNF is skilled nursing facility.  FPL is federal poverty level.  MSA is metropolitan statistical area. 
1 Results not shown for 6 percent of beneficiaries whose health status is unknown. 
2 Results not shown for 4 percent of beneficiaries of the following races/ethnicities: American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
multiple ethnicities. 
3 Results not shown for 5 percent of beneficiaries whose MSA is unknown. 
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